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RETHINKING THE TIMING OF
CAPITAL CLEMENCY
Adam M. Gershowitz*
This Article reviews every capital clemency over the last four decades. It dem-
onstrates that in the majority of cases, the reason for commutation was known
at the conclusion of direct appeals—years or even decades before the habeas
process ended. Yet when governors or pardon boards actually commuted the
death sentences, they typically waited until the eve of execution, with only
days or hours to spare. Leaving clemency until the last minute sometimes leads
to many years of unnecessary state and federal habeas corpus litigation, and
this Article documents nearly 300 years of wasted habeas corpus review. Addi-
tionally, last-minute commutations harm the victims’ families by delaying
closure for years. And reserving clemency determinations for the very end of
the process creates an information cascade that makes it harder for governors
to grant clemency in meritorious cases. This Article therefore argues for a
threshold clemency determination in capital cases at the conclusion of direct
review, before any state or federal habeas litigation has begun.
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I am doing what a governor has to do . . . . I am taking a last, long look at it.
— Governor Buddy Roemer1
Introduction
In death-penalty cases, clemency is typically the last stage of the process.
While governors have occasionally used their commutation powers to empty
death row, blanket commutations are rare.2 In the ordinary case, commuta-
tion comes only days or hours before execution.3 Sometimes the inmate has
1. Jack Wardlaw & James Hodge, Roemer Saves Inmate from Execution, Times-Picayune
(New Orleans, La.), Aug. 17, 1989, at A1 (emphasis added).
2. For an assessment of mass commutations, see Austin Sarat, Mercy on Trial:
What It Means to Stop an Execution (2005), and Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain, On
Lawful Lawlessness: George Ryan, Executive Clemency, and the Rhetoric of Sparing Life, 56 Stan.
L. Rev. 1307 (2004).
3. See James R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier, May God—or the Governor—Have Mercy:
Executive Clemency and Executions in Modern Death-Penalty Systems, 36 Crim. L. Bull. 200,
202–03 (2000) (“Executive clemency decisions typically are made in the last few days and even
the frantic hours and minutes before a scheduled execution; thus, the need for a special tele-
phone line linking the governor’s mansion and the death chamber.” (citation omitted)).
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already ordered his final meal when the governor steps forward to reduce the
sentence from death to life imprisonment.4
There is a plausible argument for leaving clemency until the end of the
process. In order to look holistically at a case, a governor or pardon board5
must have all the information to make an informed decision. And important
information may come from the years of appeals and postconviction litiga-
tion. For instance, it may only be after years of habeas corpus proceedings
that governors would learn how terribly an inmate’s lawyer performed or
about new DNA evidence suggesting his innocence.6 Therefore, the conven-
tional wisdom is that governors and pardon boards should decide whether
to commute a death sentence only at the very end of a case.
This Article challenges that conventional wisdom and advocates for a
threshold clemency determination much earlier in the criminal justice pro-
cess. Based on a review of every capital clemency decision in the last forty
years,7 I suggest that the governor or pardon board should make a clemency
determination immediately after the conclusion of the direct appeals process
but before any state or federal habeas corpus petitions are filed.8 If governors
or pardon boards decline to grant clemency at the end of the direct appeals
process, they should retain the option to revisit that decision at the conclu-
sion of the state and federal habeas corpus process. Put simply, clemency
should still be last, but it should also be much earlier in the criminal justice
process. To put the timing in perspective, the average time from conviction
to execution is almost fifteen years.9 Direct appeals typically take a few
years,10 with the habeas process covering the largest portion of the time.11
The threshold clemency determination should therefore be made relatively
4. See, e.g., Don Terry, Hours Before Execution She Sought, Illinois Woman Is Given
Clemency, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1996, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/17/
us/hours-before-execution-she-sought-illinois-woman-is-given-clemency.html.
5. In most jurisdictions with capital punishment, the governor is solely responsible for
the clemency decision. In a smaller number of states, the decision rests in whole or in part
with the pardon board. For an overview, see Molly Clayton, Note, Forgiving the Unforgivable:
Reinvigorating the Use of Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 54 B.C. L. Rev. 751, 760–61
(2013).
6. For examples of the innocence issues, see Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the
Innocent: Where Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong (2012).
7. I have analyzed capital commutations granted for individualized reasons but ex-
cluded mass commutations that emptied death row.
8. In a typical death-penalty case, the inmate first appeals to the state supreme court. If
he is unsuccessful in state court, he then files a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court
of the United States. If the Supreme Court denies certiorari, the inmate’s direct appeals are
completed. Gerald F. Uelmen, Death Penalty Appeals and Habeas Proceedings: The California
Experience, 93 Marq. L. Rev. 495 (2009).
9. Valle v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of stay).
10. This is typically, although not always, true. In California, an enormous amount of
time is spent awaiting the conclusion of direct review. See Judge Arthur L. Alarco´n, Remedies
for California’s Death Row Deadlock, 80 S. Cal. L. Rev. 697, 729 (2007).
11. See, e.g., Uelmen, supra note 8, at 502.
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early in the capital punishment process. No legal obstacle stands in the way
of considering clemency at the end of direct review.
There are three reasons supporting the unorthodox proposal to consider
clemency much earlier. First, when governors and pardon boards have com-
muted death sentences over the last few decades, they have usually based
their decisions on information that was known before the habeas corpus
process even began.12 There have been sixty-six commutations for particu-
larized reasons related to the inmate’s case since the Supreme Court rein-
stated capital punishment in 1976.13 To determine why governors or pardon
boards commuted the death sentences, I reviewed news reports, direct ap-
peals, and habeas corpus decisions, and I spoke with some of the attorneys
involved in the cases. In more than half of the cases, the reason for the
commutation was already known and fully developed at the conclusion of
direct appeals. Governors and pardon boards could have avoided roughly
300 years of litigation and hundreds of millions of dollars in expenses in
these cases if they had made their clemency decisions at the end of direct
review rather than at the conclusion of the habeas process.14
The second reason for adding a threshold clemency determination ear-
lier in the criminal justice process is that it may reinvigorate the use of exec-
utive clemency. Over the last half century, clemency has become a rarity.15
While there have been more than 1,300 executions since the Supreme Court
reinstated capital punishment in 1976, there have been only 66 individual-
ized commutations.16 By contrast, in the first half of the twentieth century, 1
out of every 4 or 5 death sentences was commuted to life imprisonment.17
In large part, the decline of clemency can be attributed to tough-on-
crime politics.18 There may also be another factor at play, however. Because
habeas corpus avenues expanded in the 1950s and 1960s, the time between
conviction and execution thereafter increased.19 And as the Supreme Court
12. See infra Part I.
13. The Death Penalty Information Center keeps careful track of commutations. See
Clemency, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/clemency (last visited
Mar. 24, 2014).
14. For a good discussion of the appellate and postconviction costs of capital punish-
ment, see Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Cost and Capital Punishment: A New Considera-
tion Transforms an Old Debate, 2010 U. Chi. Legal F. 117, 143–50.
15. See Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy,
121 Harv. L. Rev. 1332, 1348–49 (2008).
16. See Clemency, supra note 13.
17. Hugo Adam Bedau, The Decline of Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U.
Rev. L. & Soc. Change 255, 266 (1990–1991); see also Acker & Lanier, supra note 3, at 212–13
(cataloguing large numbers of commutations prior to 1972).
18. But see Michael Heise, Mercy by the Numbers: An Empirical Analysis of Clemency and
Its Structure, 89 Va. L. Rev. 239, 296 (2003) (noting the “widely held” belief that politics
influences clemency but finding a lack of statistical significance).
19. See James S. Liebman & Peter Clarke, Minority Practice, Majority’s Burden: The Death
Penalty Today, 9 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 255, 337 n.415 (2011) (documenting the increasing time
on death row); see also Nancy J. King et al., Executive Summary: Habeas Litigation in
U.S. District Courts: An Empirical Study of Habeas Corpus Cases Filed by State
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and Congress imposed additional procedural obstacles in the 1980s and
1990s,20 successful habeas claims declined.21 Thus, by the time a clemency
application lands on a governor’s desk, it is now common for the inmate to
have had more than a decade of direct appeals and postconviction habeas
proceedings, with most, if not all, of these efforts having been unsuccessful.
Social science literature tells us that information cascades affect deci-
sionmaking.22 When an actor is asked to reverse a decision that many prior
decisionmakers have upheld for many years, it is very hard to do so. By
contrast, if we were to interject a threshold clemency decision early in the
criminal justice process, before the years or decades of habeas litigation, it
might be possible to limit the information cascade and spur governors or
pardon boards to make a more independent decision. Earlier clemency re-
view might therefore lead to more clemency.
The third reason for making initial clemency determinations before the
habeas corpus process is to spare the family of the victims from emotional
trauma. When a governor or pardon board commutes a death sentence, it is
often very difficult for the victim’s family to accept that decision. If the in-
mates’ appeals and habeas petitions have been rejected for years or even
decades, it is even harder for the victim’s family to understand the last-
minute commutation. It is far more preferable for the death sentence to be
taken off the table earlier than for the governor or pardon board to quash
the hopes of the family years or decades later.
The 2011 commutation of Shawn Hawkins in Ohio encapsulates the ar-
gument for a threshold clemency determination at the conclusion of direct
appeals. Hawkins was sentenced to death in 1990 for two aggravated
murders.23 In 1993, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld his conviction and sen-
tence, but Justice Pfeifer dissented, concluding that there was doubt about
Hawkins’s guilt. In particular, Pfeifer pointed to the possibility that a code-
fendant was the actual triggerman.24 For nearly two decades thereafter, Haw-
kins litigated numerous state and federal petitions for postconviction relief.25
With his habeas options exhausted, Hawkins petitioned for clemency in
Prisoners Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, at 10
(2007), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219558.pdf.
20. See John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Byte”, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 259, 262
(2006) (“The argument I advance here is that AEDPA’s lack of bite is largely due to the fact
that the Supreme Court, in the absence of congressional habeas reform throughout the 1960s,
1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, had already significantly curtailed the writ of habeas corpus.”).
21. See Liebman & Clarke, supra note 19, at 337 n.415.
22. See infra Section II.B.
23. See State v. Hawkins, 612 N.E.2d 1227, 1232 (Ohio 1993).
24. Id. at 1236 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
25. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Coyle, 547 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 2008), aff’g in part and rev’g in part
No. C-1-97-296, 2005 WL 1684022 (S.D. Ohio July 19, 2005); State v. Hawkins, No. C-950130,
1996 WL 348024 (Ohio Ct. App. June 26, 1996) (per curiam).
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2011 and relied heavily on Pfeifer’s dissenting opinion from 1993.26 In op-
posing clemency, the county prosecutor argued that “[m]ost of what Haw-
kins’ counsel is now alleging and/or arguing has been litigated and examined
during appellate review and is not new.”27 Yet after reviewing the old evi-
dence, the pardon board was not certain that Hawkins was guilty and there-
fore recommended commutation to life imprisonment.28 Governor Kasich
concurred and, over twenty years after conviction, commuted Hawkins’s
sentence because of the very same concerns Hawkins had raised at the be-
ginning of his case.29 The victim’s mother responded that “[i]f a man can
spend 22 years in prison and still get clemency, then the system ain’t work-
ing.”30 Hawkins’s case is not unique. There are dozens of other cases in
which it is completely clear that the same clemency determination, based on
the same information, could have been made at the conclusion of direct
appeals, before the start of the habeas process.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I analyzes each of the sixty-six
death row commutations that have been granted since the Supreme Court
reinstated capital punishment in 1976. It demonstrates how the same clem-
ency decision based on the same information could have been made years or
even decades earlier in more than half the cases. Part II then argues for a
threshold clemency determination at the end of direct review but before the
habeas process begins. In addition to saving hundreds of years of litigation
and sparing the victims’ families considerable anguish, earlier clemency re-
view might increase the paltry number of commutations in capital cases.
Finally, Part III explores the approaches for implementing a threshold clem-
ency process.
I. What Do We Know at the End of Direct Appeals?
Excluding blanket commutations that emptied death row, governors and
pardon boards commuted the death sentences of sixty-six people from 1976
to 2013. In thirty-five of the sixty-six commutations, all of the necessary
information had already come to light at the conclusion of direct review. In
some of the older cases, commutation came only a few years after the con-
clusion of direct review. More often, however, governors or pardon boards
granted clemency more than a decade after direct appeals ended. All told,
considering commutation only at the end of the habeas process—rather
than providing for a threshold determination at the end of direct review—
resulted in about 300 years of unnecessary litigation and caused serious anx-
iety for the victims’ families.
26. See Ohio Adult Parole Auth., In re: Shawn L. Hawkins, OSP #A218-401, at 8
(2011), available at http://www.drc.ohio.gov/Public/clemencyhawkins218401.pdf.
27. Id. at 11.
28. Id. at 14–15.
29. See Mark Curnutte, Kasich Grants Clemency to Death Row Inmate, Cincinnati En-
quirer (June 8, 2011), http://archive.cincinnati.com/article/20110608/NEWS010702/306080
128/Kasich-grants-clemency-Death-Row-inmate.
30. Id.
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A. The Clemency Basis Was Known at the End of Direct Appeals in Over
Half of Capital Commutations
Of the thirty-five cases in which clemency unquestionably could have
been granted at the end of direct review, the most common reason for com-
mutation was doubts about the inmate’s guilt. In a large number of other
cases, the defendant’s particular characteristics—for instance, mental health
problems, age, or an abusive childhood—served as the basis for clemency.
Other reasons for commutation included differential treatment of codefend-
ants, support from jurors or the victim’s family, proportionality, failure to
preserve evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel, racial discrimination,
and religious conversion. I analyze the cases below.
1. Doubts About Guilt
The most common reason for governors’ commuting a sentence from
death to life imprisonment relates to doubts about the inmate’s guilt. In nine
cases, governors waited until the eve of execution, even though all necessary
information was available years earlier.
As noted above, the most recent doubt-based commutation involved
Governor Kasich’s commutation of Hawkins.31 Hawkins had raised ques-
tions about his guilt in his 1993 direct appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court,
but he managed to convince only one of the seven justices.32 For the next
eighteen years, Hawkins filed state and federal petitions for postconviction
review without success.33 In 2011, however, without any new evidence of his
innocence since his conviction, Hawkins convinced Kasich to commute his
sentence.34 If the Ohio governor had considered clemency at the conclusion
of direct appeals, it would have saved decades of litigation and reduced anxi-
ety for the victim’s family.
A similar turn of events occurred a decade earlier in the commutation of
Phillip Dewitt Smith. In 2001, Governor Keating of Oklahoma commuted
Smith’s death sentence because the governor was not convinced to a “moral
certainty” that Smith was guilty.35 Keating noted that there was no eyewit-
ness or forensic testimony and that the case against Smith was circumstan-
tial.36 But these evidentiary deficiencies were clear from the time of Smith’s
death sentence in 1984 and were discussed in a dissenting opinion in Smith’s
31. See supra notes 23–30 and accompanying text.
32. See State v. Hawkins, 612 N.E.2d 1227, 1236 (Ohio 1993) (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
33. See supra note 25.
34. Curnutte, supra note 29.
35. Barbara Hoberock, Keating Spares Life of Slayer, Tulsa World, Apr. 10, 2001, at A1,
available at http://www.tulsaworld.com/archives/keating-spares-life-of-slayer/article_5e63864e-
9b86-55ae-8525-f47d0c20ab7a.html.
36. See id.
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direct appeal.37 Smith remained on death row for fourteen years longer than
necessary.
Another nearly identical commutation occurred in Maryland in 2000.
Almost twenty years after Eugene Colvin-El was sentenced to death and
more than fifteen years after his direct appeals ended,38 Maryland Governor
Glendening commuted his sentence because there was not enough certainty
of his guilt.39 At Colvin-El’s trial, there was neither eyewitness testimony nor
forensic evidence, and he did not confess to the murder.40 The commutation
decision was based on the same evidence (or lack thereof) from trial, not
new evidence discovered years later. More than fifteen years of litigation,
including a retrial on sentencing and at least five state and federal postcon-
viction review decisions,41 could have been avoided if the governor made a
clemency determination at the conclusion of direct review.
In a more high-profile commutation, Governor Bush of Texas reduced
the sentence of Henry Lee Lucas in 1998 because of doubts that Lucas had
committed the crime for which he was to be executed.42 In the early 1980s,
Lucas confessed to nearly 600 murders, and in 1984 he was sentenced to
death in a Texas case.43 By 1985, it was clear that Lucas had invented most of
the murders. According to one officer, Lucas “would have admitted to killing
Abraham Lincoln if you asked him to.”44 In April 1985, Lucas recanted his
confession to all but three of the murders, making front-page news across
the country.45 He said that his confessions were “all a big hoax meant to
embarrass law enforcement and weed out corrupt officers who used his fake
confessions to clear unsolved murders.”46 When Bush commuted Lucas’s
37. See State v. Smith, 737 P.2d 1206, 1218 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987) (Parks, J., dissent-
ing) (“[T]he evidence against the appellant was entirely circumstantial, and cannot properly
be termed overwhelming.”).
38. See Colvin v. State, 472 A.2d 953 (Md. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873 (1984).
39. Matthew Mosk & Daniel LeDuc, Glendening Commutes Death Sentence; Lack of ‘Ab-
solute Certainty’ Cited in 1980 Killing, Wash. Post, June 8, 2000, at A1.
40. Id.
41. See Colvin-El v. Nuth, 205 F.3d 1332 (4th Cir. 1999), aff’g in part and rev’g in part
No. Civ.A. AW 97-2520, 1998 WL 386403 (D. Md. July 6, 1998); Colvin-El v. State, 753 A.2d
13 (Md. 2000); Colvin-El v. State, 630 A.2d 725 (Md. 1993); State v. Colvin, 548 A.2d 506
(Md. 1988).
42. Bruce Tomaso & David McLemore, Bush Spares Lucas from Death Penalty: Governor
Commutes Sentence to Life, Cites Doubts Over Guilt, Dallas Morning News, June 27, 1998, at
1A.
43. Id.
44. Cynthia Gorney & Paul Taylor, The Killer Who Recanted; Did Henry Lee Lucas Kill All
Those People?, Wash. Post, Apr. 15, 1985, at B1.
45. See, e.g., 210 Deaths Recanted, Paper Says, Sun-Sentinel (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Apr.
14, 1985, at 1A, available at http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1985-04-14/news/8501140358_1_
lucas-confessions-henry-lee-lucas-murders; George Kuempel, DPS Chief Defends Work on Lu-
cas Case, Dallas Morning News, Apr. 17, 1985, at 1A; Storer Rowley, Is Lucas a Bigger Liar
Than Killer?, Chi. Trib., Apr. 18, 1985, at 1, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/
1985-04-18/news/8501220836_1_lucas-confessions-henry-lee-lucas-lucas-isn-t.
46. Tomaso & McLemore, supra note 42.
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sentence in 1998, his decision did not turn on new evidence discovered in
the thirteen years since Lucas recanted.47 Rather, Bush simply waited until
the postconviction process had run its course and commuted the sentence
four days before the execution.48 More than thirteen years of litigation, plus
emotional trauma to the victims’ families, could have been avoided if clem-
ency was considered at the end of direct appeals.
In 1992, North Carolina Governor Martin commuted the death sentence
of Anson Avery Maynard because of doubts about Maynard’s guilt.49 Martin
focused on the fact that “no physical evidence linked Maynard to the crime
and that the only eyewitness to testify was an admitted participant in the
murder who was given immunity from prosecution.”50 Although Martin
claimed that he considered “some” evidence not before the jury, he never
specified what evidence that was.51 The facts cited by Martin—the lack of
physical evidence and the eyewitness’s immunity—were known from the
beginning of trial, and the immunity issue was raised nearly a decade earlier
in Maynard’s direct appeal.52 The direct appeals concluded in 1984,53 but
Martin did not grant clemency until more than seven years later.
The case of Ronald Monroe in Louisiana involved an even more inex-
cusable delay in commutation. Monroe, a mildly mentally handicapped la-
borer with no prior criminal record,54 was sentenced to death in 1980 for
killing his neighbor, Lenora Collins.55 Only a few months after the trial, a
prison inmate named George Stinson, who had previously been married to
Collins, confessed to another inmate that he had killed her.56 Stinson’s con-
fession was credible because he made it while in prison for killing another
47. James Pinkerton & Kathy Walt, Lucas’ Life Spared, But He May Never Be ‘Free Again’,
Hous. Chron., June 27, 1998, at A1 (quoting district attorney and juror as saying there had
been no new evidence).
48. S.K. Bardwell & Patty Reinert, Kin of Lucas Victim ‘Disappointed’ in Bush: Older Sister
Planned to Witness Execution, Hous. Chron., June 27, 1998, at A29. This was entirely in keep-
ing with Bush’s philosophy of deferring to the judiciary and denying clemency because an
inmate had “full and fair access to the courts.” Adam M. Gershowitz, The Diffusion of Respon-
sibility in Capital Clemency, 17 J.L. & Pol. 669, 677–78 (2001).
49. Bruce Henderson, Martin Commutes Man’s Death Sentence, Charlotte Observer,
Jan. 11, 1992, at 1A.
50. Id.
51. See id.
52. See State v. Maynard, 316 S.E.2d 197, 215 (N.C. 1984).
53. See Maynard v. North Carolina, 469 U.S. 963 (1984).
54. Wardlaw & Hodge, supra note 1.
55. State v. Monroe, 397 So. 2d 1258, 1263 (La. 1981).
56. Wardlaw & Hodge, supra note 1.
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one of his ex-wives.57 In late 1983, just as Monroe’s direct appeals were re-
jected,58 his attorneys learned of Stinson’s confession.59 Nevertheless, neither
the governor nor the Louisiana Board of Pardons acted on this credible
claim of innocence. Instead, Monroe spent five years unsuccessfully seeking
federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that Stinson’s confession should
have been disclosed to him earlier.60 In 1988, the pardons board unani-
mously recommended commuting the sentence, but Governor Roemer still
did not make a clemency determination because the Louisiana Supreme
Court had stayed the execution.61 Litigation continued, with the state of
Louisiana petitioning for the stay to be lifted62 and the Louisiana Supreme
Court eventually allowing the execution to move forward in August 1989.63
With no appellate avenues remaining, Roemer commuted Monroe’s sen-
tence two weeks before his scheduled execution.64 The very same outcome,
based on the same information, could have been reached nearly six years
earlier at the conclusion of direct appeals.
On his last day in office in 1987, Governor Hughes of Maryland com-
muted the death sentence of Doris Ann Foster because of lingering doubts
about her guilt.65 Foster had been convicted of killing her landlord, but she
had claimed at trial that her husband was responsible.66 Foster’s husband
had confessed on multiple occasions but had recanted.67 Hughes commuted
Foster’s sentence, explaining that “there remained some doubt whether Fos-
ter committed the crime.”68 Foster’s claim of innocence was known at trial,
well before the conclusion of direct appeals. Because Hughes acted relatively
57. See id.
58. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in July 1983 and denied rehearing in Septem-
ber 1983. Monroe v. Louisiana, 463 U.S. 1249 (1983); Monroe v. Louisiana, 463 U.S. 1229
(1983).
59. Monroe v. Blackburn, 476 U.S. 1145, 1146 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[I]t was
not until late 1983 that independent investigation by petitioner’s counsel led him to Detective
Gallardo, who told of Stinson’s incriminating admissions and of the fact that the New Orleans
police had long before known of the new evidence.”).
60. See Monroe v. Butler, 883 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1988), aff’g 690 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. La.
1988); Monroe v. Blackburn, 748 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1984).
61. Wardlaw & Hodge, supra note 1.
62. State ex rel. Monroe v. Butler, 535 So. 2d 732 (La. 1988).
63. State ex rel. Monroe v. Butler, 547 So. 2d 367 (La. 1989).
64. See Wardlaw & Hodge, supra note 1.
65. Gwen Ifill, Md. Woman’s Death Term Commuted: Hughes Takes Action on His Final
Day, Wash. Post, Jan. 21, 1987, at B7.
66. Foster v. State, 464 A.2d 986, 988–89 (Md. 1983).
67. Id. at 989 (“In a letter dated 30 January, allegedly written by the accused’s husband to
her, he in essence admitted that he had killed the victim. In addition, in a letter postmarked 19
June 1981 addressed to ‘The Attorney General, Cecil County, MD,’ written by the accused’s
husband, he not only confessed that he killed the victim and was solely responsible for her
death, but also described in detail the circumstances surrounding the murder.”); id. at 989 n.2
(“At trial, the accused’s husband admitted writing this letter. He explained that he had lied in
the letter in order to protect the accused.”).
68. Ifill, supra note 65.
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quickly, Foster sat on death row for less than a year after the conclusion of
her direct appeals.69
In 1983, Florida Governor Graham commuted the death sentence of
Jesse Rutledge.70 The sparse news reports indicate that the governor may
have been influenced by the possibility that another man, Charles (Sonny)
Bessent, more closely matched the description of the suspect.71 The victim
had previously complained that Bessent had beaten and sexually assaulted
her.72 Although it is not absolutely certain when the information about Rut-
ledge’s innocence emerged, two attorneys who represented him believed that
the evidence about Bessent’s possible involvement was known at the time
of trial.73 The commutation came about four years after Rutledge’s
conviction.74
Finally, the case of Christopher Hallman also supports the proposal to
make threshold clemency decisions at the conclusion of direct appeals. Hall-
man was convicted in 1973 for murder; he slit a woman’s throat in a bar
fight, and she slipped into a coma and later died.75 The jury was led to
believe that Hallman directly caused the victim’s death.76 Hallman’s direct
appeals failed, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1976.77 Some-
where around that time (the exact date is unclear), Hallman’s attorneys
learned that the victim’s estate had filed a wrongful death suit against the
hospital where she was treated.78 Hospital records showed that the victim
actually died as a result of medical malpractice.79 After conducting an inter-
nal investigation, the hospital quietly settled the malpractice lawsuit.80 Hall-
man sought a new trial, but his request was rejected on December 1, 1976.81
69. See Foster v. State, 503 A.2d 1326 (Md. 1986), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1023 (1986).
Foster was awarded a new trial on sentencing, which explains the long delay between her trial
and the conclusion of her direct appeals. Foster, 464 A.2d 986.
70. Graham Backs Clemency for Condemned Man, Miami Herald, Apr. 7, 1983, at 2B.
71. See id.
72. Id.
73. See Telephone Interview with James G. Feiber, Jr., Founding Partner, Salter Feiber,
P.A. (July 8, 2013) (clemency counsel); Telephone Interview with Alan R. Parlapiano, Of
Counsel, Fine, Farkash & Parlapiano, P.A. (July 8, 2013) (trial counsel).
74. See Graham Backs Clemency for Condemned Man, supra note 70. Rutledge’s direct
appeal became final on April 21, 1980. See Rutledge v. Florida, 446 U.S. 913 (1980).
75. See Hallman v. State, 305 So. 2d 180, 181 (Fla. 1974).
76. See id. (“On April 10, 1973, appellant inflicted fatal cuts with broken glass about the
throat and neck of Eleanor Groves, slit her throat, which resulted in her death . . . .”).
77. See Hallman v. Florida, 428 U.S. 911 (1976).
78. A January 1977 news story discussed the hospital error. Tom Fiedler, Is He Con-
demned for Hospital’s Error?, Miami Herald, Jan. 23, 1977, at A1; see also David Von Drehle,
Among the Lowest of the Dead: The Culture of Capital Punishment 188–89 (2006);
Michael L. Radelet & Barbara A. Zsembik, Executive Clemency in Post-Furman Capital Cases,
27 U. Rich. L. Rev. 289, 309 (1993).
79. See Fiedler, supra note 78.
80. See id.
81. Id.
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Hallman’s attorneys then brought the malpractice information before the
Florida Parole and Probation Commission, which recommended clemency.82
The attorneys then presented the same information to the governor in
March 1977, but instead of ruling on the clemency petition, the governor
“prodded [the assistant public defender] to ask the state Supreme Court for
a new trial for Hallman.”83 More than two years later, with a new governor
in office, Hallman’s death sentence was finally commuted.84 Although it is
not clear exactly when the exonerating evidence was publicly disclosed, the
information was certainly available around the conclusion of direct review.
***
Across numerous states—Florida, Louisiana, Maryland, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oklahoma, and Texas—inmates remained on death row for years de-
spite doubts about their guilt. When judicial review ended and troubling
cases came close to execution, governors and pardon boards stepped forward
and granted clemency. And yet if they had considered clemency at the con-
clusion of direct review, they would have removed potentially innocent men
from death row decades earlier and saved tens of millions of dollars in litiga-
tion costs.
2. Defendant-Specific Characteristics: Mental Capacity, Mental Illness,
History of Abuse, and Age
Of the thirty-five commutations that could have been granted at the
conclusion of direct review, six were eventually granted based on the charac-
teristics or background of the defendant. Governors or pardon boards fo-
cused on the defendant’s mental capacity, mental illness, history of abuse,
and age.
The recent commutation of Joseph Murphy provides a compelling case
for considering clemency earlier. In 1987, Murphy was sentenced to death
for the brutal murder of an elderly woman.85 On September 26, 2011, more
than twenty-four years later, Governor Kasich commuted his punishment to
life imprisonment, concluding that because of his “brutally abusive upbring-
ing and the relatively young age at which he committed this terrible crime,
the death penalty is not appropriate in this case.”86 Yet the Ohio Supreme
Court considered this very argument in 1992 as part of Murphy’s direct
82. See 3 More Cases Go to Clemency Board for Final Answer, Ocala Star-Banner, Mar.
29, 1977, at 7A.
83. Id.
84. 2nd Fla. Killer Given Stay, Wash. Post, June 27, 1979, at A15 (noting that Hallman’s
sentence was commuted to life).
85. State v. Murphy, 605 N.E.2d 884, 888, 897 (Ohio 1992).
86. Alan Johnson, Governor Spares Life of Condemned Killer, Columbus Dispatch
(Sept. 26, 2011), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2011/09/26/kasich-approves-
clemency-for-joseph-murphy.html.
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appeal. The court split four to three on the issue of whether Murphy’s trau-
matizing background should be grounds for setting aside his death sentence.
The majority of the court noted as follows:
It is undisputed that the mental capacity of appellant places him in the
lowest six or seven percent of the population. Appellant was born into an
impoverished background, had an alcoholic father, was the victim of ver-
bal, physical and sexual abuse as a child and was generally maladjusted
throughout his life. He was generally isolated from other members of his
family and was often the brunt of taunting by his parents and siblings. He
was also relatively young at the time of the commission of the offense.
While these family circumstances are indeed tragic, they are nevertheless
outweighed by the aggravating circumstances presented by the instant
case.87
Three dissenting justices refused to agree that Murphy’s abusive upbringing
should be disregarded. In a detailed dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Moyer
spent more than two pages describing the disturbing details of Murphy’s
childhood.88
In short, the very issue that divided the Ohio Supreme Court in 1992
was the same issue that led the governor to grant clemency nearly twenty
years later in 2011. In between, Murphy filed numerous postconviction re-
view petitions that were denied.89
Another recent Ohio case also supports the argument for earlier clem-
ency determinations. In 2012, Kasich commuted the death sentence of John
Jeffrey Eley, convicted for a 1986 murder, because of his limited mental ca-
pacity.90 This issue had been presented at trial,91 and Eley raised it in his
direct appeals.92 In granting clemency, Kasich pointed to the fact that the
prosecutor in the case now believed that execution was unwarranted.93 Yet
the prosecutor’s change of opinion was not a last-minute decision based on
new evidence. Shortly before Kasich’s decision, the prosecutor noted that
87. Murphy, 605 N.E.2d at 908.
88. Id. at 909–11 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).
89. See, e.g., Murphy v. Ohio, 551 F.3d 485 (6th Cir. 2009), aff’g No. 3:96 CV 7244, 2006
WL 3057964 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2006); Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2001); State
v. Murphy, 663 N.E.2d 939 (Ohio 1996); State v. Murphy, No. 9-04-36, 2005 WL
280446 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2005); State v. Murphy, No. 9-94-52, 1995 WL 275766 (Ohio
Ct. App. May 12, 1995).
90. Reginald Fields, Kasich Commutes Sentence of Death-Row Inmate Eley, Plain Dealer
(Cleveland, Ohio), July 11, 2012, at B1.
91. See State v. Eley, 672 N.E.2d 640, 645 (Ohio 1996) (“Dr. Douglas Darnall, a clinical
psychologist, found Eley to be of borderline intelligence, and ranked him in the twelfth per-
centile on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Test.”).
92. Id. at 646, aff’g No. 87 C.A. 122, 1995 WL 758808 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 20, 1995).
93. Alan Johnson, Kasich Cancels Death Sentence, Columbus Dispatch, July 11, 2012, at
3B, available at http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2012/07/11/kasich-cancels-
death-sentence.html.
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Eley’s case “has haunted me for more than 24 years.”94 In short, the gover-
nor could have granted clemency to Eley based on his limited intelligence
when the U.S. Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari to his direct appeal
in 1993.95 Instead, the commutation was delayed for nearly fifteen years,
until two weeks before the scheduled execution.96
The same scenario occurred in Indiana. In 2005, Governor Daniels com-
muted the death sentence of Arthur Baird in part because it appeared that
Baird was mentally ill at the time of the crime.97 Baird had raised mental
illness and insanity arguments in his direct appeals over a decade earlier.98 In
granting clemency, Daniels also relied on the fact that, a few years after
Baird’s sentence, Indiana law changed to allow jurors the option to impose
life without the possibility of parole.99 The law changed in 1993, but clem-
ency was not granted until 2005, just days before Baird’s scheduled
execution.100
On his last day in office in 2003, Governor Patton of Kentucky com-
muted the death sentence of Kevin Stanford.101 Stanford, who was sentenced
to death for a murder he committed when he was seventeen, had litigated
his death sentence for decades, including in the infamous U.S. Supreme
Court decision that upheld the death penalty for juvenile offenders.102 Patton
commuted Stanford’s death sentence fourteen years after the Supreme Court
decision and more than twenty years after Stanford entered death row. The
stated reason for the commutation was that the governor “believed sentenc-
ing a juvenile to death is an excessive punishment.”103 Yet that rationale was
known from the very moment the case began—and it was certainly known
when Patton took office in 1995.104 In total, fourteen needless years elapsed
from the conclusion of direct appeals in 1989 and the clemency grant in
2003.
94. Gary L. Van Brocklin, Letter to the Editor, Man Sitting on Death Row Does Not De-
serve to Die for His Crime, Columbus Dispatch, July 7, 2012, at 9A, available at http://
www.dispatch.com/content/stories/editorials/2012/07/07/man-sitting-on-death-row-does-not-
deserve-to-die-for-his-crime.html.
95. Eley, 672 N.E.2d 640, cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1124 (1997).
96. See Fields, supra note 90.
97. Governor Commutes Death Sentence, WTHR (2005), http://www.wthr.com/Global/
story.asp?s=3778726.
98. Baird v. State, 604 N.E.2d 1170, 1177 (Ind. 1992).
99. Governor Commutes Death Sentence, supra note 97.
100. Id.
101. Tom Loftus, Patton Has Short, Quiet Last Day as Governor, Courier-J. (Louisville,
Ky.), Dec. 9, 2003, at 1B.
102. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). The Court’s precedent in Stanford
lasted for sixteen years, a shorter period than Stanford’s death sentence. The case was over-
ruled by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
103. See Loftus, supra note 101.
104. Id.
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The previous year, Alexander Williams, a schizophrenic man convicted
of murder, came within hours of execution before the pardon board com-
muted his sentence.105 Shortly before the execution, the Georgia Board of
Pardons and Paroles dispatched experts to evaluate Williams and—presuma-
bly based on the experts’ evaluation as well as on the fact that Williams was
under the age of eighteen at the time of the crime—commuted Williams’s
sentence to life without parole.106 Yet Williams’s age and his mental-health
problems had been known from the very beginning of the case. The Los
Angeles Times revealed that “[n]umerous reports over the last dozen years by
prison doctors and psychologists have described Williams as severely men-
tally ill and ‘out of touch with reality.’ ”107 The Washington Post explained
that in 1990, a dozen years before the commutation, “he attacked one of his
attorneys, saying that a little red man had instructed him to do so, and later
strutted around his prison cell, wearing a mask made from a bedsheet and
calling himself the Lone Ranger.”108 While Williams’s mental-health issues
were not raised at trial, they were raised and considered as part of his direct
appeal.109 Nearly thirteen years elapsed between the conclusion of direct ap-
peals and the commutation.110
Finally, in 1999, Virginia Governor Gilmore commuted the death sen-
tence of Calvin Swann because of his mental illness less than five hours
before Swann’s scheduled execution.111 Swann, who was forty-four years old
at the time of the commutation, had been diagnosed as mentally ill at the
age of nineteen.112 He had been involuntarily committed to psychiatric hos-
pitals sixteen times before he committed the murder that led to his death
sentence.113 When Swann arrived on death row, he “was continually scream-
ing and flushing his toilet. He was placed in four point restraints. The next
day, he smeared feces all over his cell.”114 Not surprisingly, Swann’s mental
illness figured prominently in his direct appeals.115 Although all of the infor-
mation necessary to commute Swann’s death sentence was available at the
105. See Henry Weinstein, Mentally Ill Killer Gains Clemency, L.A. Times, Feb. 26, 2002, at
A18, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2002/feb/26/news/mn-29957.
106. See David Firestone, Georgia Will Not Execute Mentally Ill Killer, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26,
2002, at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/26/us/georgia-will-not-execute-
mentally-ill-killer.html.
107. Weinstein, supra note 105.
108. Sue Anne Pressley, Ga. Inmate’s Death Sentence Commuted, Wash. Post, Feb. 26,
2002, at A2.
109. Williams v. State, 368 S.E.2d 742, 750 (Ga. 1988).
110. Williams’s direct appeals concluded in July 1989. See id., cert. denied, 492 U.S. 925
(1989). His sentence was commuted in February 2002. See Weinstein, supra note 105.
111. Donald P. Baker, Gilmore Stops Execution for First Time; Mental Illness of Inmate
Cited, Wash. Post, May 13, 1999, at A1.
112. Frank Green, Swann’s Execution Set Wednesday; Mental Health Cited in Clemency Bid,
Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 9, 1999, at C4.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Swann v. Commonwealth, 441 S.E.2d 195 (Va. 1994).
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conclusion of his direct appeals in 1994,116 the clemency grant did not come
until nearly five years later.
3. Questionable Evidence and Procedures
In four cases, governors commuted death sentences because of troubling
procedural problems at trial or disconcerting police tactics during the initial
investigation. These last-minute commutations followed decades of unneces-
sary litigation.
In 2010, Governor Strickland of Ohio commuted the death sentence of
Kevin Keith, who had been on death row for over sixteen years.117 Strick-
land’s decision appeared to turn on a defective lineup procedure used by the
police and a troubling identification by a victim of the crime.118 Keith raised
this information in a pretrial motion,119 and it was one of his primary appel-
late issues on direct review.120 Keith’s direct appeals ended in 1998, but the
commutation of his sentence did not occur until a dozen years later.121
In 2008, Oklahoma Governor Henry commuted the death sentence of
Kevin Young based on a four-to-one recommendation of the pardon
board.122 News analysis of the clemency hearing appeared to indicate that the
governor and pardon board based their decisions in large part on the fact
that the jurors in the case “did not want to give Young the death sentence
but did not receive clarification when they asked whether Young would be
eligible for parole if he was sentenced to life without parole.”123 The jurors’
116. See Swann v. Virginia, 513 U.S. 889 (1994).
117. See Alan Johnson, Governor Commutes Death Sentence to Life, Columbus Dispatch,
Sept. 3, 2010, at 1A, available at http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2010/09/03/
governor-commutes-death-sentence-to-life.html.
118. See Editorial, Case for Clemency, Akron Beacon J., Aug. 23, 2010, at A5, available at
http://www.ohio.com/editorial/editorials/case-for-clemency-1.177222 (mistakenly claiming
that this information was new).
119. Donna Glenn, Lawyer: Defendant Victim of Mistaken Identity, Columbus Dispatch,
May 20, 1994, at 2B (“Banks told jurors police arrested the wrong man based on witnesses’
descriptions of an unknown, large, black man they saw after the shootings at the Bucyrus
Estates apartments Feb. 13.”); Donna Glenn, Selection of Suspect Questioned, Columbus Dis-
patch, May 13, 1994, at 4C (“Attorney James Banks of Columbus had questioned procedures
used by police to identify the gunman . . . . Banks claimed Bucyrus police used improper
methods in providing the names of four possible suspects to [Richard] Warren, who police
said identified Keith as the gunman.”).
120. See State v. Keith, No. 3-94-14, 1996 WL 156710, at *10–12 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 5,
1996).
121. See State v. Keith, 684 N.E.2d 47 (Ohio 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1063 (1998).
122. Michael McNutt & Julie Bisbee, Governor Spares Second Killer’s Life, Oklahoman,
July 25, 2008, at 1A; Julie Bisbee, Board Asks Henry to Stop Inmate’s Execution, NewsOK (July
9, 2008), http://newsok.com/board-asks-henry-to-stop-inmates-execution/article/3267727.
123. Julie Bisbee, Clemency Bid Brings 30-Day Execution Stay: Governor Will Review Sen-
tence Given in 1996 Slaying at a Steak House, NewsOK (July 16, 2008), http://newsok.com/
clemency-bid-brings-30-day-execution-staybrspan-classhl2governor-will-review-sentence-
given-in-1996-slaying-at-a-steak-house.span/article/3270720/ (discussing juror statements
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statements had never been presented to a court and took the attorney gen-
eral by surprise.124 It appears that Young’s lawyers simply gathered the ju-
rors’ statements in order to make a convincing case for mercy at the
clemency hearing. Defense lawyers could have used the same approach if
there had been a clemency hearing at the conclusion of direct appeals, which
occurred seven years earlier.125
Over a decade after Kenneth Foster was sentenced to death, Governor
Perry of Texas commuted his sentence because Foster (who was the getaway
driver) had been jointly tried along with the triggerman.126 Perry thought
that this procedure, which obviously was known from the very beginning of
the case, was unfair and that “the Legislature should examine” it.127 Follow-
ing the conclusion of direct appeals, Foster filed three separate state habeas
corpus petitions and multiple federal habeas corpus petitions, all of which
were decided while Perry was governor.128 None of that litigation would have
been necessary if Perry or his predecessor had considered clemency earlier in
the process.
Last but not least, Governor Hunt of North Carolina commuted the
death sentence of Marcus Carter in 2000 because of the lack of counsel at
trial.129 Carter’s first murder trial resulted in a hung jury.130 In the four
months before the retrial, Carter’s attorneys refused to speak with him, and
he therefore requested new counsel.131 At the second trial, the judge gave
Carter the choice either to rely on the same lawyers or to appear pro se.132
Carter chose to represent himself and was sentenced to death.133 This course
of events was well known from the very beginning of Carter’s retrial, and the
during clemency hearing); see also McNutt & Bisbee, supra note 122 (noting that the clemency
appeal “hinged on jury”).
124. Bisbee, supra note 123 (quoting the attorney general as stating that “the [clemency]
hearing was the first time that information was presented to the state”).
125. See Young v. State, 12 P.3d 20 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1055
(2001).
126. Emily Ramshaw, Perry Commutes Texas Death Row Inmate Foster’s Sentence: Sentence
Commuted to Life for Driver in ‘96 Murder, Dallas Morning News, Aug. 31, 2007, at 1A.
127. Id.
128. See Foster v. Quarterman, 466 F.3d 359, 363 (5th Cir. 2006); Foster v. Dretke, No.
05-70016, 2006 WL 616980 (5th Cir. Mar. 13, 2006); Ex parte Foster, No. WR-50823-03, 2007
WL 2460745 (Tex. Crim. App. Aug. 27, 2007); Ex parte Foster, No. WR-50823-02, 2007 WL
2257150 (Tex. Crim. App. Aug. 7, 2007).
129. Liz Chandler, Gov. Hunt Intervenes to Call Off Execution, Charlotte Observer,
Nov. 22, 2000, at 1A.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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events could have been the basis of a clemency grant at any time. Neverthe-
less, Hunt waited until the day of execution to commute Carter’s sen-
tence134—more than eight years after trial and almost five years after the
conclusion of direct review.135
4. Different Treatment of Codefendants
Inmates often seek clemency on the ground that a codefendant received
a lighter sentence.136 In theory, a request for mercy on this basis could be
resolved early in the criminal justice process. When codefendants are in-
volved, it is usually clear by the end of trial—and potentially even before
trial if there was a plea bargain—whether one defendant is being treated
much more harshly than another. In four cases, however, governors and
pardon boards waited, very inefficiently, until the eve of execution to com-
mute death sentences based on differential treatment of codefendants.
One day before Wendell Flowers was to be executed, North Carolina
Governor Hunt commuted his death sentence to life without parole.137
While he had been incarcerated for another crime, Flowers confessed to fa-
tally stabbing a prisoner.138 Because three other perpetrators involved in the
killing were not sentenced to death, Hunt concluded that it would be unfair
to execute Flowers.139 The fate of Flowers’s codefendants was clear from the
beginning of the case and thus Hunt could have made his clemency decision
years earlier instead of waiting until the day before the execution.140
The same situation occurred in the Florida case of Michael Salvatore.
Salvatore and two codefendants stood trial for the murder of a businessman,
but only Salvatore was sentenced to death.141 The different sentence for Sal-
vatore was obviously known at the conclusion of trial, and Salvatore raised
this issue in his direct appeal.142 The governor commuted Salvatore’s death
sentence about eighteen months after the end of direct review.143
134. See id.
135. See State v. Carter, 451 S.E.2d 157, 161 (N.C. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1107
(1995).
136. Scholars sometimes refer to this as sentencing equity. See, e.g., Elizabeth Rapaport,
Straight Is the Gate: Capital Clemency in the United States from Gregg to Atkins, 33 N.M. L.
Rev. 349, 358 (2003).
137. Foon Rhee, Governor Blocks Execution, Charlotte Observer, Dec. 16, 1999, at 1A.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See id. Flowers’s execution date (and commutation) came only about a year after the
conclusion of direct review. See State v. Flowers, 489 S.E.2d 391 (N.C. 1997), cert. denied, 522
U.S. 1135 (1998).
141. Graham: Clemency Needed in Miami Case, Miami News, May 6, 1981, at 16A.
142. Salvatore v. State, 366 So. 2d 745, 749–51 (Fla. 1978) (“[D]efendant says that the
death penalty is unconstitutionally imposed when a co-defendant on similar facts is not sen-
tenced to death.”).
143. See Salvatore v. Florida, 444 U.S. 885 (1979).
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In another Florida case, Richard Henry Gibson’s death sentence was
commuted because “one of his accomplices was sentenced to life and two
others were never prosecuted.”144 Prosecutors had argued in one trial that
the codefendant had been the shooter, but they argued in Gibson’s case that
Gibson was the shooter.145 Gibson was sentenced to death in 1975146 and his
direct appeals were final in 1978,147 but he was not granted clemency until
1980.148
Finally, in the first commutation after the Supreme Court reinstated
capital punishment, the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles commuted
the death sentence of Charles Harris Hill because he was sentenced more
harshly than were his codefendants.149 Hill was one of three people involved
in a murder during a failed burglary.150 The first codefendant, the actual
shooter, pled guilty to murder and received a life sentence; the second code-
fendant agreed to testify against Hill and was rewarded with a plea of volun-
tary manslaughter and a ten-year sentence.151 The pardon board moved
relatively quickly and commuted Hill’s sentence exactly one year after the
Georgia Supreme Court rejected his direct appeal.152
5. Support for Clemency from Jurors and the Victim’s Family
Three death sentences have been commuted at least in part because the
jurors who imposed the death sentence later indicated that they favored a
lighter sentence.153 Similarly, at least one commutation was based on the fact
that the victim’s family opposed the execution. The statements from jurors
and victims often became public only after the clemency was granted. But
there is no reason to think the jurors or family members formed their opin-
ions because of years of postconviction litigation. Had the clemency decision
been made years earlier, the jurors and family members likely would have
made the same statements.
As discussed above,154 Oklahoma Governor Henry commuted the death
sentence of Kevin Young because the jurors in the case “did not want to give
Young the death sentence but did not receive clarification when they asked
144. Radelet & Zsembik, supra note 78, at 301.
145. Von Drehle, supra note 78, at 190.
146. Graham Signs Two Death Warrants, Miami News, Apr. 18, 1980, at 2A.
147. See Gibson v. State, 351 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1004 (1978).
148. Graham Signs Two Death Warrants, supra note 146.
149. Radelet & Zsembik, supra note 78, at 309–10.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See Hill v. State, 229 S.E.2d 737 (Ga. 1976).
153. Two of these three cases are also discussed above in conjunction with other reasons—
specifically, procedural problems and mental illness—for granting clemency. See supra notes
97–100, 122–125 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 122–125 and accompanying text.
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whether Young would be eligible for parole if he was sentenced to life with-
out parole.”155 The jurors made these statements for the first time at the
clemency stage.156 Because the jurors’ statements stemmed from a faulty trial
procedure rather than from a change of heart after trial, there is every reason
to think they would have made the same statements if the clemency decision
had been made before the habeas corpus process began. Young remained on
death row for seven years following the end of his direct appeals.157
Statements from jurors played a smaller, albeit notable, role in the com-
mutation of Arthur Baird’s death sentence. As discussed above,158 Governor
Daniels commuted Baird’s sentence because of his mental illness, although
Daniels also relied on statements from jurors that they would have imposed
life without parole if that option had been available at trial.159 Although In-
diana law was changed to add a life without parole option in 1993, the same
year that Baird’s direct appeals ended,160 Daniels did not commute the sen-
tence until days before Baird’s execution in 2005.161 The jurors likely would
have made their statements earlier if clemency had been considered earlier.
A nearly identical turn of events played out in the commutation of Wil-
lie James Hall. While the Georgia parole board did not state its reasons for
commuting Hall’s sentence, six of the jurors from Hall’s trial offered sworn
statements to the board indicating that they would have given Hall life with-
out parole if that were an option at his trial.162 The parole board did not
commute Hall’s sentence until 2004, thirteen years after the end of direct
review and one day before his scheduled execution.163
Relatedly, the views of the victim’s family have also factored into com-
mutation decisions.164 At the clemency hearing for William Neal Moore, the
victim’s niece noted that when she met Billy Moore on the night he was
arrested, “he told her he was sorry and asked for her forgiveness.”165 The
155. See McNutt & Bisbee, supra note 122 (noting that the clemency appeal “hinged on
jury”); Bisbee, supra note 123.
156. Bisbee, supra note 123.
157. See Young v. State, 12 P.3d 20 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1055
(2001).
158. See supra notes 97–100 and accompanying text.
159. Governor Commutes Death Sentence, supra note 97.
160. See Baird v. Indiana, 510 U.S. 893 (1993).
161. See supra text accompanying note 100.
162. Carlos Campos & Bill Rankin, Murderer’s Sentence Commuted, Atlanta J.-Const.,
Jan. 27, 2004, at 1B (“On Monday, six of the jurors offered sworn statements to the parole
board that they would have given Hall life without parole if that sentence had been an option
at his trial.”). The board members may have also relied in part on the district attorney’s
statement that he did not oppose life without parole because of Hall’s good behavior in prison
and his lack of a criminal record prior to the crime. See id.
163. See id.
164. In the case of Jeffrey Hill (see discussion infra Section I.A.11), the family’s statements
played a small role in the Ohio governor’s decision to grant clemency. See infra notes 215–219
and accompanying text.
165. Holly Morris, Board Spares Murderer: Term Commuted to Life in Prison, Atlanta J.-
Const., Aug. 22, 1990, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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chairman of the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles explained that “[t]o
say the least, the board was very much impressed by the fact that we did
have family of the victim who . . . also asked for clemency. That is something
that we do not often see.”166 The pardon board also based its decision on the
fact that Moore was sentenced to death without a jury trial before the U.S.
Supreme Court had ruled on the constitutionality of Georgia’s death penalty
statute.167 Both pieces of information—the lack of a jury trial and the fam-
ily’s support for commutation—were available at the end of Moore’s direct
appeals nearly fourteen years before commutation.168
6. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
One of the best arguments against conducting a clemency determina-
tion after direct appeals is that we may not yet know whether the defendant
received ineffective assistance of counsel. In state and federal habeas pro-
ceedings, courts can conduct hearings to document evidence about the qual-
ity of the lawyering that would not necessarily be clear from the trial
record.169 For this reason, many states do not even allow ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claims on direct review.170 Occasionally, however, there are
capital cases in which the defense lawyer’s incompetence is known by the
end of the direct appeals process. In one case, poor lawyering was well
known from the beginning of the case and served as the basis for commuta-
tion decades later.
In 2012, Governor Kasich of Ohio commuted the death sentence of
Ronald Post.171 In voting five to three to recommend clemency, the Ohio
Parole Board focused on “omissions, missed opportunities and questionable
decisions made by his previous attorneys and [recommended clemency] be-
cause that legal representation didn’t meet expectations for a death penalty
case.”172 The attorneys’ poor performance was well known at the time of
trial. For instance, in 1987, the local newspaper ran a front-page story ex-
plaining that Post’s attorneys convinced him to plead no contest to the mur-
der charges and, allegedly, promised him that, by doing so, he would not
166. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
167. Id.
168. See Moore v. State, 213 S.E.2d 829 (Ga. 1975) (per curiam), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910
(1976).
169. See Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 679, 688–89 (2007) (arguing for earlier
consideration of ineffective assistance claims on direct review).
170. Carissa Byrne Hessick, Ineffective Assistance at Sentencing, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1069, 1097
& n.165 (2009).
171. See Editorial, Correcting Authority: The Governor’s Appropriate Choice in the Ronald
Post Case, Akron Beacon J., Dec. 19, 2012, at A6.
172. Ronald Post, Condemned Obese Ohio Killer, Granted Clemency, CBS News (Dec. 17,
2012, 5:21 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ronald-post-condemned-obese-ohio-killer-
granted-clemency/.
22 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 113:1
receive the death penalty.173 The public defender’s office focused on the no
contest plea and other alleged ineffectiveness in the direct appeal of Post’s
death sentence.174 The Ohio Supreme Court rejected the ineffectiveness
claim in a written opinion.175 While the federal habeas court considered the
issue in more detail twenty-three years later,176 the ineffectiveness issue was
well known in 1987 and the governor could have relied on it then (just as in
2012) as the basis for commutation.
7. Racial Discrimination
Although there is an extensive literature on racial discrimination and
the death penalty,177 race (perhaps not surprisingly) has played a compara-
tively minor role in successful commutations during the modern era. One
exception is the 2001 commutation of Robert Bacon Jr. in North Carolina.
In 2001, Governor Easley commuted Bacon’s death sentence without giving
a specific explanation.178 It appears, however, that Easley “agreed that Bacon
received the death penalty, rather than life in prison, largely because of his
race.”179 Bacon and his lover, Bonnie Clark, killed Clark’s husband in order
to acquire life insurance proceeds.180 Clark, who was white, was sentenced to
life imprisonment; Bacon, who was black, was sentenced to death.181 Bacon’s
commutation came more than six-and-a-half years after the conclusion of
direct review.182
8. Failure to Preserve Evidence
Although DNA exonerations have received enormous attention in recent
years, the government’s failure to preserve evidence has also stopped execu-
tions. In two cases, governors commuted death sentences because potentially
exculpatory evidence had been destroyed or lost.
173. David Knox & Scott Stephens, Ronald Post’s Plea Puts Him on Death Row—C-T Probe
Raises Question: Was It Legal?, Chron.-Telegram (Lorain County, Ohio), Jan. 14, 1987, at A1.
174. Id.
175. State v. Post, 513 N.E.2d 754, 762–63 (Ohio 1987).
176. See Post v. Bradshaw, 621 F.3d 406 (6th Cir. 2010).
177. For an overview, see David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination and
the Death Penalty: An Empirical and Legal Overview, in America’s Experiment with Capital
Punishment 501 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003).
178. Anna Griffin, Easley Spares Man on N.C. Death Row: Robert Bacon Gets Life for Mur-
der in Case with Racial Overtones, Charlotte Observer, Oct. 3, 2001, at 1A.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. One additional fact could move the Bacon case into the uncertainty category. A
juror came forward shortly before the execution and said that other jurors had made racist
comments during deliberations. I have coded the case as supporting the theory that threshold
clemency decisions can be made at the conclusion of direct appeals because the different result
for a black and white defendant in the same case appears to be the main reason for Bacon’s
commutation.
182. See State v. Bacon, 446 S.E.2d 542 (N.C. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1159 (1995).
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In 2005, Virginia Governor Warner commuted the death sentence of
Robin Lovitt because the murder weapon had been destroyed prior to the
start of federal habeas corpus proceedings.183 The destruction of the evi-
dence was litigated throughout the federal court system, and Warner granted
clemency the day before the scheduled execution,184 more than four years
after the conclusion of direct review.185
In a very similar case, Governor Easley commuted the death sentence of
Charlie Mason Alston Jr. in 2002. Although the governor did not specify the
basis for his decision, Alston’s clemency petition “was based largely on miss-
ing scrapings from beneath” the victim’s fingernails.186 The sheriff’s office
lost the scrapings, which could have contained DNA from the perpetrator,
“sometime between Alston’s 1992 trial and a 1996 appeal.”187 The governor
made his clemency decision years later and just nine hours before the sched-
uled execution.188 Had the governor considered clemency at the end of direct
review,189 it would have saved nearly six years of litigation.
In both of these cases, the loss of evidence was well known at the con-
clusion of direct review. Nevertheless, the governors waited until the eve of
execution to commute the death sentences, no doubt hoping that courts
would act first.
9. Proportionality
Inmates who have been sentenced to death often argue that their
sentences are disproportionate to the sentences received by defendants in
comparable cases. When the Supreme Court reinstated capital punishment
in 1976, it seemed to require that states conduct proportionality review of
death sentences on appeal.190 By 1983, however, the Court backtracked and
held that judicial proportionality review was not mandatory.191 Nevertheless,
proportionality claims are still raised in clemency proceedings. In two cases,
governors were swayed by proportionality arguments, although they did not
act until the last minute.
A few days before leaving office in January 2011, Governor Bredesen of
Tennessee commuted the sentence of Edward Jerome Harbison because
183. See David Stout, Clemency Stops an Execution in Virginia, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 2005,
at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/30/national/30execution.html.
184. Id.
185. See Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 537 S.E.2d 866 (Va. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 815
(2001).
186. Anna Griffin, Easley Commutes Alston’s Sentence, Charlotte Observer, Jan. 11,
2002, at 1A.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See Alston v. North Carolina, 461 S.E.2d 687 (N.C. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1148
(1996).
190. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976).
191. For a helpful analysis, see William W. Berry III, Practicing Proportionality, 64 Fla. L.
Rev. 687, 695–697 (2012).
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“when [he] compare[d] it to others [he did]n’t think it rose to the level of a
death penalty crime.”192 Harbison had been sentenced to death in 1983, and
his case had wound its way up and down the state and federal courts for
almost thirty years.193 He even managed to have the Supreme Court decide
whether the federal statute governing appointment of counsel for an indi-
gent state defendant allows the attorney to represent the prisoner in subse-
quent state clemency proceedings.194 After decades of litigation, the governor
granted clemency based on information that was available directly after
Harbison’s trial ended. In total, more than twenty-four years passed between
the conclusion of direct review and Harbison’s commutation.195
In 1996, Illinois Governor Edgar commuted the death sentence of Guin-
evere Garcia for killing her husband. The commutation came less than four
years after Garcia’s trial and before her direct appeals were even final.196 The
speed of the clemency decision was not due to Edgar’s decision to act at the
conclusion of the direct appeals process—as this Article suggests—but be-
cause Garcia abandoned her appeals and requested to be put to death.197
Although some speculated that Edgar granted clemency because Garcia was
a woman or because her husband sexually abused her,198 Edgar maintained
that he commuted her sentence because of a lack of premeditation and pro-
portionality.199 Edgar concluded that Garcia’s case looked more like a rob-
bery gone wrong than a premeditated vicious homicide that merited
death.200 Although Edgar did not set out to resolve the clemency question
before the conclusion of direct appeals, this case demonstrates that it is pos-
sible to do so.
192. Brian Haas, Bredesen Commutes Death Sentence, Pardons 22, Tennessean, Jan. 12,
2011 (internal quotation marks omitted).
193. For bookends of the state litigation, see State v. Harbison, 704 S.W.2d 314 (Tenn.
1986), and Harbison v. State, No. E2011–01711–CCA–R3–PC, 2012 WL 1956757 (Tenn.
Crim. App. May 31, 2012).
194. A majority of the Court agreed with Harbison that such representation is authorized
under the statute. Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180 (2009).
195. See Harbison, 704 S.W.2d 314, cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1153 (1986).
196. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected Garcia’s direct appeal on May 30, 1995. People
v. Garcia, 651 N.E.2d 100, 109 (Ill. 1995). Garcia did not petition the U.S. Supreme Court for
certiorari. Edgar granted clemency in early 1996 after “celebrity Bianca Jagger became aware of
Ms. Garcia’s case and, over her objection, petitioned Governor Edgar for clemency on her
behalf.” Heise, supra note 18, at 270.
197. Edgar Commutes Sentence; Guinevere Garcia, Killer of Abusive Husband, to Serve Life
Without Parole, Chi. Trib., Jan. 16, 1996, at 1 [hereinafter Edgar Commutes Sentence].
198. For a detailed analysis of the case, see Lorraine Schmall, Forgiving Guin Garcia:
Women, the Death Penalty, and Commutation, 11 Wis. Women’s L.J. 283 (1996).
199. See Edgar Commutes Sentence, supra note 197.
200. Official Statement, Chi. Sun-Times, Jan. 17, 1996, at 18 (“Horrible as was her crime,
it is an offense comparable to those that judges and jurors have determined over and over
again should not be punishable by death.”).
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10. Religious Conversion
Death-row inmates have famously made religious conversions prior to
their executions,201 although this has rarely moved governors to commute
their sentences.202 In one case, however, a governor granted clemency based
on rehabilitation. At the end of his term, Governor Schwinden of Montana
followed the recommendation of the state board of pardons and commuted
the death sentence of David Cameron Keith.203 Schwinden visited Keith in
prison and concluded that “[h]e certainly manifests a deep sense of remorse
. . . . He is a very strong Christian.”204 In addition to focusing on Keith’s
“legitimate religious conversion,” the pardon board had also noted that
“Keith is partially paralyzed and nearly blind from gunshot wounds . . . and
may have shot his victim in reflex to being shot himself.”205 Whether
Schwinden relied exclusively on Keith’s religious conversion or on other fac-
tors as well, the case demonstrates that it is possible to make a threshold
clemency decision at the conclusion of direct review. Keith’s conviction be-
came final in March of 1988, and the commutation came nine months later
in December 1988.206
11. Mixed Rationales
In commuting death sentences, governors sometimes point to multiple
reasons for their decision. In three cases, governors offered a panoply of
reasons for last-minute commutations, and all of these reasons were known
at the end of direct review.
In 2012, Governor Markell of Delaware commuted the sentence of Rob-
ert Gattis after the state pardons board recommended commutation by a
vote of four to one.207 The board was swayed by the fact that only ten of the
twelve jurors voted for death,208 that other offenders were not punished as
201. The most famous example is probably Karla Faye Tucker. See Mary Sigler, Mercy,
Clemency, and the Case of Karla Faye Tucker, 4 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 455 (2007).
202. B. Douglas Robbins, Comment, Resurrection from a Death Sentence: Why Capital
Sentences Should Be Commuted upon the Occasion of an Authentic Ethical Transformation, 149
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1115, 1169 (2001). Commentators, however, have advocated for such commuta-
tions. E.g., id. at 1170.
203. Outgoing Governor Extends Clemency to Killer, Deseret News, Jan. 2, 1989, at E2,
available at http://www.deseretnews.com/article/29202/outgoing-governor-extends-clemency-
to-killer.html.
204. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
205. Id.
206. See State v. Keith, 754 P.2d 474 (Mont. 1988). Keith never petitioned the Supreme
Court for certiorari.
207. Gattis Spared: Markell Commutes Death Sentence to Life in Prison, News J. (Wilming-
ton, Del.) (Jan. 18, 2012) [hereinafter Gattis Spared] (“Markell cited the ‘unusual and perhaps
historic’ recommendation of the Delaware Board of Pardons . . . to offer Gattis mercy.”).
208. Board of Pardons Recommendation to Governor Markell Regarding Clemency of Robert
Gattis, news.delaware.gov (Jan. 15, 2012), http://news.delaware.gov/2012/01/15/board-of-
pardons-recommendation-regarding-clemency-of-robert-gattis/. Delaware is one of only a
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harshly,209 and that Gattis had a traumatizing childhood.210 Markell com-
muted Gattis’s sentence three days before the execution.211 Yet all of the cru-
cial information was known since his 1990 conviction and sentence,212 and
therefore it was certainly known when the Supreme Court denied certiorari
in 1994.213 At least eighteen years of litigation, and perhaps more, could have
been avoided if a Delaware governor considered the case earlier.
A similar mixed-rationale clemency occurred in Ohio three years before.
In 2009, Governor Strickland commuted the death sentence of Jeffrey Hill,
who had been on death row for seventeen years.214 Strickland agreed with
the parole board, which had offered five reasons for clemency: “the views of
the victim’s family, the lack of adequate representation by counsel at Mr.
Hill’s sentencing, the remorse demonstrated by Mr. Hill regarding his ac-
tions, the lack of proportionality of the sentence of death in this case when
compared with similar murder cases, and the expressed views of two justices
of the Ohio Supreme Court which reviewed this case on appeal.”215 Hill’s
direct appeals raised the proportionality and ineffective assistance of counsel
claims,216 and the comments of the Ohio Supreme Court justices came as
part of the direct appeal.217 The parole board noted that Hill expressed re-
morse during his first interviews with the police following the crime.218 Fi-
nally, although the victim’s family members did not speak out against Hill’s
execution until the clemency proceeding, the parole board observed that
they “were unaware that they could speak out on his behalf at the time of
the court proceedings,” which suggests that they would have spoken earlier
if the clemency hearing had been held following direct appeals.219
Finally, in 1980, Governor Graham of Florida commuted the death sen-
tence of Darrell Hoy, who had been involved in the brutal rape and murder
handful of states that allows nonunanimous jury votes. Adam M. Gershowitz, Delaware’s Capi-
tal Jury Selection: Inadequate Voir Dire and the Problem of Automatic Death-Penalty Jurors, 2
Del. L. Rev. 235, 237–38 (1999).
209. Sean O’Sullivan, Board of Pardons Votes to Spare Convicted Killer, News J. (Wilming-
ton, Del.) (Jan. 16, 2012), http://www.delawareonline.com/article/20120116/NEWS01/
201160322/.
210. Gattis Spared, supra note 207.
211. Id.
212. See, e.g., Gattis v. State, 637 A.2d 808, 822 (Del. 1994) (en banc) (“In evaluating the
evidence in mitigation, the trial judge . . . noted that in his childhood the defendant had
experienced abuse and been exposed to domestic violence.”).
213. See Gattis v. Delaware, 513 U.S. 843 (1994).
214. See Gov. Strickland Issues Statement on Clemency Application of Jeffrey D. Hill, U.S.
Fed. News Service, June 3, 2009.
215. Id.
216. State v. Hill, No. C-920497, 1993 WL 538902, at *7–9 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 22, 1993).
217. State v. Hill, 653 N.E.2d 271, 284–85 (Ohio 1995) (Wright, J., dissenting).
218. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., In Re: Jeffrey D. Hill, OSP #A261-876, at 9 (2009),
available at http://www.drc.ohio.gov/public/Clemency_JeffreyHill.pdf.
219. See id.
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of a Florida woman.220 Graham did not explain the reason for the commuta-
tion,221 although media coverage suggests that the clemency application fo-
cused on the fact that the judge overrode the jury’s recommendation for a
life sentence and imposed death instead.222 Hoy’s lawyer also focused on the
fact that Hoy was “young, impressionable and of low intelligence.”223 All of
this information was known at the time of trial, and the same clemency
decision therefore could have been made more than a year earlier at the
conclusion of direct appeals.224
B. Cases Where the Same Information Was Probably Available at the
Conclusion of Direct Review
In addition to the thirty-five cases set forth in Section I.A, there are an
additional six cases in which the information justifying the clemency grant
was probably available at the end of direct review. In each of these cases,
however, there is not enough information to be certain.
In 2010, Governor Strickland commuted the death sentence of Sidney
Cornwell because the jury had not been informed that Cornwell suffered
from Klinefelter’s syndrome, which is associated with developmental diffi-
culties.225 The diagnosis of this syndrome only came about as part of post-
conviction litigation.226 Even though no court mentioned Klinefelter’s
syndrome by name in Cornwell’s direct appeals, the courts did consider the
symptoms that eventually gave rise to the diagnosis.227 The key facts (albeit
shorn of the technical medical terminology) were thus known by the conclu-
sion of direct appeals, about a decade before the clemency grant.228
220. Virginia Ellis, 2 Death Warrants Signed; Hoy May Get Life, St. Petersburg Times,
Jan. 10, 1980, at 1B.
221. Id. Graham “made a point of never saying publicly why he chose to commute a
man’s sentence. . . . Graham worried that if he spelled out his reasons for granting mercy,
clemency would become just another quasi-judicial proceeding.” Von Drehle, supra note 78,
at 190.
222. See Nancy Kalwary, A Murderer’s Life Goes on the Line, Evening Indep. (St. Peters-
burg, Fla.), Dec. 12, 1979, at 26A. Florida allows judges to override jury recommendations for
life sentences. Michael Mello & Ruthann Robson, Judge Over Jury: Florida’s Practice of Imposing
Death Over Life in Capital Cases, 13 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 31 (1985).
223. Kalwary, supra note 222.
224. See Hoy v. Florida, 439 U.S. 920 (1978).
225. Joe Gorman, Clemency Stuns Family, Detective, Trib. Chron. (Warren, Ohio), Nov.
17, 2010, https://www.tribtoday.com/page/content.detail/id/549705/Clemency-stuns-family--
detective.html.
226. Cornwell v. Bradshaw, 559 F.3d 398, 408 (6th Cir. 2009).
227. State v. Cornwell, 715 N.E.2d 1144, 1155–56 (Ohio 1999) (“Psychologist James Ei-
senberg testified that Cornwell functions in the low average to borderline range of intelligence,
with a verbal IQ of 83. Based on various tests that he administered to Cornwell, Eisenberg
described Cornwell as a person who is shy and fairly introverted and as one who lacks self-
confidence and has low self-esteem.”).
228. See Cornwell v. Ohio, 528 U.S. 1172 (2000). Because it is possible that the specific
diagnosis of Klinefelter’s syndrome was the basis for the commutation, I have placed
Cornwell’s case in the “likely” rather than “certainly” category.
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Also in 2010, Governor Bredesen of Tennessee granted clemency to
Gaile Owens, who had been on death row since 1986 for the murder of her
husband.229 The governor pointed to the fact that Owens had been abused
during her marriage230 and that she had consistently admitted her guilt in
the murder and accepted a conditional guilty plea, which later became inef-
fective.231 Additionally, the governor noted that he had reviewed thirty-three
other Tennessee cases in which a wife was convicted of first-degree murder
for arranging the murder of her husband, and the governor observed that
each case had resulted in life imprisonment.232 Some of this information—
such as the revoked guilty plea and many of the thirty-three murder-for-hire
cases—was known at the conclusion of direct appeals. But Owens did not
acknowledge that she suffered abuse from her spouse until after direct re-
view ended.233
If the governor had been called upon to grant clemency at the conclu-
sion of Owens’s direct appeals, Owens may or may not have offered infor-
mation about the domestic abuse at that point. In any event, it is not clear
how much emphasis the governor placed on the abuse. In his statement
explaining the commutation, Bredesen said only that “there’s at least the
possibility of her being in an abusive marriage” and then made a brief refer-
ence, in a single sentence, to abuse being a factor in the severity of the pun-
ishment.234 By contrast, the governor spent four paragraphs detailing the
revoked guilty plea and discussing comparable cases where the defendant
did not receive the death penalty.235 On balance, given that governors have a
propensity to grant clemency for female offenders236 and that many of the
key facts giving rise to Owens’s commutation were known from the time of
her trial, it is likely (although not certain) that the governor would have had
access to the salient information at the conclusion of direct appeals. If so, a
clemency determination at that point would have saved more than twenty-
two years of postconviction petitions.237
In 1999, Arkansas Governor Huckabee commuted the death sentence of
Bobby Ray Fretwell after a juror appeared before the Arkansas Post-Prison
229. Jeff Woods, Governor’s Statement on Owens Commutation, Nashville Scene (July
14, 2010, 10:55 AM), http://www.nashvillescene.com/pitw/archives/2010/07/14/governors-
statement-on-owens-commutation.
230. See id.
231. Id.
232. Id. Bredesen noted that one of the thirty-three had been sentenced to death and
commuted by a previous governor.
233. Clay Carey, Influential Nashvillians, Juror Fight Gaile Owens’ Execution, Tennessean,
May 2, 2010, available at http://www.tennessean.com/article/20100502/NEWS03/5020370.
234. Woods, supra note 229.
235. Id.
236. See, e.g., Heise, supra note 18, at 277 (“Women are significantly more likely to receive
clemency than men, even after controlling for an array of background factors.”).
237. Owens’s direct appeals ended in 1988. See State v. Porterfield, 746 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn.
1988), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988).
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Transfer Board to urge clemency.238 The juror, who was from the same small
town where the murder occurred, said he felt pressured to vote for a death
sentence because he lived in the town.239 At trial, the jury had been dead-
locked eleven to one, and the judge’s charge to break the deadlock was a
major issue in Fretwell’s direct appeal.240 Huckabee granted clemency based
on the holdout juror’s plea for mercy.241 It is impossible to say for certain,
but it stands to reason that the juror would have made the same plea for
mercy at the end of the direct appeals process that he did on the eve of
execution. Fretwell remained on death row for nearly thirteen years after his
direct appeals ended.242
In 1999, Governor James of Alabama commuted the death sentence of
Judith Ann Neelley without ever offering an explanation.243 Although there
could be multiple reasons for the commutation, legal scholars believe that it
was because Neelley was a woman.244 The capital punishment system rarely
imposes or carries out death sentences against women.245 Thus, it seems very
likely, although not certain, that the rationale for the commutation would
have been available a dozen years earlier at the conclusion of direct
appeals.246
In 1996, Governor Allen of Virginia commuted the death sentence of
Joseph Payne, who had been convicted of killing another prison inmate.247
The primary witness against Payne, an inmate named Robert Francis Smith,
recanted his allegations in 1987, only a year after Payne’s conviction.248
238. Steve Barnes, Death-Row Inmate Spared After Juror Makes Plea, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6,
1999, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/06/us/death-row-inmate-spared-
after-juror-makes-plea.html.
239. Id.
240. Fretwell v. State, 708 S.W.2d 630, 632–33 (Ark. 1986).
241. Arkansas Governor Listens to Plea, Spares Killer’s Life, L.A. Times, Feb. 6, 1999, availa-
ble at http://articles.latimes.com/1999/feb/06/news/mn-5472 (“[The juror] said he was the lone
holdout against the death penalty.”).
242. See Fretwell, 708 S.W.2d 630. Fretwell never petitioned for a writ of certiorari.
243. Kathy Kemp & Scottie Vickery, Women on Death Row: Is the Death Penalty Sexist?
Only Three Women Ever Executed in Alabama, Birmingham News, Sept. 19, 1999, at 1-E
(noting that eight months after the commutation the governor “has yet to explain publicly”
the commutation).
244. Id.
245. Victor L. Streib, Special Feature, Rare and Inconsistent: The Death Penalty for Women,
33 Fordham Urb. L.J. 609 (2006); see also John Kraemer, An Empirical Examination of the
Factors Associated with the Commutation of State Death Row Prisoners’ Sentences Between 1986
and 2005, 45 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1389, 1406 (2008) (“Adjusting for other characteristics,
women on death row between 1986 and 2005 had nearly eleven times the odds of clemency.”);
Elizabeth Rapaport, Staying Alive: Executive Clemency, Equal Protection, and the Politics of Gen-
der in Women’s Capital Cases, 4 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 967, 978 (2001).
246. See Neelley v. Alabama, 480 U.S. 926 (1987).
247. Laura LaFay, Allen Commutes Death Sentence: Reprieve Comes 3 Hours Before Joseph
Payne’s Scheduled Death, Virginian-Pilot (Norfolk, Va.), Nov. 18, 1996, at A1.
248. Id.
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Smith, however, later recanted his recantation.249 Shortly before the execu-
tion date, Smith took a polygraph test, and the results indicated that he
fabricated parts of his testimony.250 It was not clear whether Allen granted
clemency primarily because of the polygraph test or because he found Smith
to be generally untrustworthy. Allen vaguely explained that Smith’s recanta-
tion was a factor and that he found Smith “not sufficiently believable, obvi-
ously, to allow the death sentence to proceed.”251 It is difficult to say what
would have happened if the governor had made a threshold clemency deci-
sion at the conclusion of direct appeals—rather than making the decision
only hours before execution. It is possible that the governor would have
found Smith to be an untrustworthy witness in 1987,252 just as he did in
1996. It is also possible that Smith would have sat for a polygraph test in
1987, just as he did in 1996. Because Smith changed his story so many times,
however, it is difficult to say for certain how the governor would have de-
cided the clemency question at an earlier time.
In 1992, Governor Wilder of Virginia commuted the death sentence of
Herbert Bassette because of questions about his innocence.253 Bassette’s law-
yers focused their clemency petition on the credibility of three trial witnesses
and on evidence that implicated another man.254 The credibility of the trial
witnesses was raised in Bassette’s 1981 direct appeal to the Virginia Supreme
Court.255 And the other possible perpetrator was actually arrested and
charged with the murder before Bassette, but the police chose to focus on
Bassette instead.256 Thus, it seems that all of the key information that formed
the basis of the clemency decision was actually known more than a decade
before Wilder granted clemency. But there remains a remote possibility that
new evidence could have influenced the governor’s decision. At Bassette’s
trial, a woman testified that her boyfriend had confessed to the crime but
that he tended to be a braggart and therefore she didn’t believe him.257
Shortly before Bassette’s execution, the woman changed her story and told
defense attorneys that she believed her boyfriend had been telling the
249. Id.
250. Peter Finn, Polygraph Test Cited in Clemency, Wash. Post, Nov. 9, 1996, at B3.
251. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
252. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Payne’s case in 1987. Payne v. Virginia, 484
U.S. 933 (1987).
253. Peter Hardin & Jim Mason, Wilder Spares Bassette from Electric Chair, Richmond
Times-Dispatch, Jan. 23, 1992, at 1.
254. Id.
255. Bassett v. Commonwealth, 284 S.E.2d 844, 850 (Va. 1981) (“The Commonwealth
presented three key witnesses . . . . Each had been convicted of crimes. Bassett [sic] sought in a
pretrial discovery motion before his first trial to obtain records of those convictions. He ar-
gued that the trial court’s refusal prevented him from effectively impeaching the witnesses’
testimony and contributed to his erroneous conviction.”).
256. Arthur Hodges, Murder Case Evidence Questioned, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Dec.
15, 1991, at B1.
257. Jim Mason, Inmate’s Lawyers Abandon Court Fight, Appeal for Clemency, Richmond
Times-Dispatch, Jan. 22, 1992, at 15.
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truth.258 While this piece of evidence was new, it does not appear that it was
the reason for clemency.259 Rather, the governor seemed to focus on the
credibility of the witnesses who implicated Bassette at trial.260 Nevertheless,
it is impossible to say for certain whether the recanted testimony played any
role in the clemency decision.
***
In these six cases, it is not possible to say for certain that a governor
could have used the same information to make the same decision at the
conclusion of direct appeals. But there is enough information to make an
educated guess that the outcome probably would have been the same.
C. Insufficient Information in Some Cases to Assess Whether Clemency
Could Have Been Granted Earlier
In eight cases, it is not possible to assess whether a governor or pardon
board could have relied on the same information to commute a sentence at
the conclusion of direct review. These cases can be subdivided into two cate-
gories: (1) the governor or pardon board did not state a reason for the com-
mutation; and (2) the governor relied on multiple reasons for the
commutation, only some of which were clear at the end of direct review.
In four very recent cases, it is impossible to discern the reason for the
commutation because the governor or pardon board offered nothing or very
little in the way of explanation. In 2012, the Georgia State Board of Pardons
and Paroles offered no reason for ending Daniel Greene’s twenty-one year
stay on death row.261 Four years earlier, the Georgia board commuted the
death sentence of Samuel David Crowe less than three hours before execu-
tion, but it “did not give a reason for its decision.”262 In 2011, Missouri
Governor Nixon commuted the death sentence of Richard Clay in Missouri
“[w]ith almost no explanation” other than that he based his decision on a
“number of factors.”263 Finally, in 2010, Governor Henry followed a divided
recommendation of the Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board and commuted
the death sentence of Richard Tandy Smith.264 Henry’s explanation for the
258. Id.
259. See Hardin & Mason, supra note 253.
260. See id.
261. See Jim Mustian, Update: Paroles Board Grants Clemency to Condemned Taylor County
Prisoner, Ledger-Enquirer (Columbus, Ga.), Apr. 20, 2012, http://www.ledger-enquirer.com/
2012/04/20/2019283/paroles-board-commutes-sentence.html.
262. Georgia Man’s Death Sentence Changed to Life in Prison, CNN (May 22, 2008, 10:31
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/05/22/georgia.execution/index.html.
263. Phil O’Connor, Nixon Discusses Commuting Death Sentence, St. Louis Post-
Dispatch, Jan. 14, 2011, http://www.stltoday.com/news/state-and-regional/missouri/nixon-
discusses-commuting-death-sentence/article_2571da0d-d239-5ff1-a50b-ec3925d7999c.html
(internal quotation marks omitted).
264. See Michael McNutt, Oklahoma Gov. Brad Henry Approves Clemency Recommenda-
tion, Oklahoman, May 20, 2010, at 15A, available at http://newsok.com/oklahoma-gov.-brad-
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commutation was vague; he stated only that “after reviewing all of the evi-
dence and hearing from both prosecutors and defense attorneys, I decided
the Pardon and Parole Board made a proper recommendation to provide
clemency and commute the death sentence.”265
In four other cases, it is not possible to say if clemency could have been
granted at the end of direct appeals because governors relied on multiple
rationales for the commutations, with some of these rationales unavailable
at the end of direct review. Two recent cases from Ohio, as well as clemen-
cies in Missouri and Georgia, fall into this category.
In 2010, Governor Strickland of Ohio commuted Richard Nields’s death
sentence to life imprisonment because (1) there was a faulty conclusion by
the medical examiner that evidence showed premeditation, and (2) appellate
judges had repeatedly expressed concern about whether the facts of the case
evinced sufficiently heinous conduct to merit death.266 The proportionality
concerns were apparent during the direct appeals process,267 although the
problems with the medical examiner’s testimony were not clear until later.
Two years earlier, Strickland commuted the death sentence of John
Spirko, who had been on death row for nearly twenty-five years. There had
long been questions about whether Spirko was guilty of the crime, and he
had raised innocence questions in his direct appeals.268 After the Ohio Parole
Board granted seven reprieves for DNA testing to be conducted, the test was
administered shortly before the scheduled execution, but the results came
back inconclusive—the DNA neither inculpated nor exculpated Spirko.269
While questions about Spirko’s innocence had surfaced since the time of his
conviction, it is not clear what role the last-minute, inconclusive DNA test
played in the grant of clemency.
In 1993, Missouri Governor Carnahan commuted the death sentence of
Bobby Lee Shaw, who had been on death row for almost fourteen years.
henry-approves-clemency-recommendation/article/3462495; Brian Evans, Oklahoma Board
Votes for Clemency in Death Penalty Case, Amnesty International USA (Mar. 26, 2010, 11:05
AM), http://blog.amnestyusa.org/deathpenalty/update-oklahoma-board-votes-for-clemency-
in-death-penalty-case/.
265. McNutt, supra note 264 (internal quotation marks omitted).
266. Sharon Coolidge & Jon Craig, Board Votes for Mercy for Killer, Cincinnati En-
quirer, May 19, 2010; Alan Johnson, Inmate Moved Off Death Row, Columbus Dispatch,
June 5, 2010, at 1B, available at http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2010/06/05/in
mate-moved-off-death-row.html.
267. See State v. Nields, 752 N.E.2d 859, 899 (Ohio 2001) (Pfeifer, J., dissenting) (“I do
not believe that Nields’s is the type of crime that the General Assembly did contemplate or
should have contemplated as a death penalty offense.”).
268. See State v. Spirko, No. 15-84-22, 1989 WL 17734 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 6, 1989).
269. Alan Johnson, Strickland Commutes Spirko’s Death Sentence to Life Without Parole,
Columbus Dispatch, Jan. 10, 2008, at 1B, available at http://www.dispatch.com/content/
stories/local/2008/01/09/spirk.html. Strickland commuted Spirko’s death sentence because
“the lack of physical evidence linking him to the murder, as well as the slim residual doubt
about his responsibility for the murder that arises from careful scrutiny of the case record and
revelations about the case over the past 20 years, makes the imposition of the death penalty
inappropriate in this case.” Id.
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While Shaw was serving a life sentence for first-degree murder, he murdered
a prison guard.270 At trial, a psychiatrist testified to Shaw’s low IQ but con-
cluded that he was only borderline mentally disabled and did not suffer
from a mental disease or defect.271 Years later, however, the Missouri Capital
Punishment Resource Center unearthed new evidence of Shaw’s mental-
health issues and convinced the psychiatrist who testified at trial to recant
the trial testimony.272 A few months before the execution, lawyers presented
additional expert testimony in a competency hearing.273 One week before
Shaw’s execution, Carnahan commuted his sentence because of his mental-
health problems.274 There was evidence of these problems at trial. And it is
possible that lawyers would have presented the new psychiatric evidence if a
clemency hearing had been held at the end of direct appeals. But it is not
possible to say for certain whether the governor would have had all the same
information at that point.
Finally, it is impossible to say whether the commutations of ex-marine
Harold Williams could have been made earlier. A spokesman for the Georgia
Board of Pardons and Paroles said that “there was ample evidence the co-
defendant . . . was the ringleader in the murder,” that the codefendant
served only five years, and that the codefendant signed an affidavit taking
responsibility for the murder while he was in prison.275 Williams raised his
limited role in the murder in his direct appeal,276 but it is not clear when the
other factors came to light. Because the pardon board did not explain which
factors were most important and when the information became available, it
is impossible to say for certain whether the necessary information was
known at the conclusion of direct appeals.
D. Cases in Which Crucial Information Came After Direct Review
In seventeen cases, commutations were based on information that sur-
faced only after the postconviction process had begun. In some of these
cases, governors or pardon boards still could have granted clemency years
earlier than they actually did, but it would not have been possible to reach
the same conclusion at the end of direct review.
270. State v. Shaw, 636 S.W.2d 667, 669 & n.1 (Mo. 1982).
271. See id. at 670.
272. Edward Walsh & Sue Anne Pressley, Time Running Out Again for 2 Residents of Death
Row, Wash. Post, June 1, 1993, at A4.
273. Id.
274. Virginia Young, Carnahan Commutes Killer’s Death Sentence: Inmate with Mental
Problems Gets Life Term, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, June 3, 1993, at 1A.
275. Jingle Davis, Ex-Marine’s Death Sentence for Murder Is Commuted, Atlanta J.-
Const., Mar. 23, 1991, at B5.
276. See Williams v. State, 300 S.E.2d 301, 305 (Ga. 1983).
34 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 113:1
1. Commutations Based on Recent Legal Developments
In three cases, the Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia277—
which outlawed the execution of the mentally disabled—led to commuta-
tions. In 2002, three psychologists evaluated Thomas Nevius and concluded
that he was mentally disabled.278 The Nevada Board of Pardons then unani-
mously commuted Nevius’s sentence.279 The following year, Governor Foster
of Louisiana commuted the death sentence of Herbert Welcome.280 Welcome
had the intellectual abilities of an eight year old and had been on death row
for over twenty years.281 The Atkins decision also indirectly led to the com-
mutation of Darnell Williams in Indiana.282 In 2003, one year after Atkins, a
state judge ruled that Williams’s codefendant was mentally disabled and
could not be executed.283 The following year, Governor Kernan commuted
Williams’s sentence because he believed that Williams was less culpable than
the codefendant.284
In two other cases, different legal developments created a basis for clem-
ency that did not exist before the conclusion of direct review. Six hours
before Freddie Davis was to be executed in Georgia, the Board of Pardons
and Paroles stayed (and later commuted) his death sentence.285 The board
pointed to “questions over Davis’ role in the killing, a new trial granted an
alleged accomplice and the accomplice’s recantation of incriminating testi-
mony.”286 Because the accomplice’s death sentence was not reversed until
1988,287 well after the conclusion of Davis’s direct appeals, the same clem-
ency determination could not have been made earlier. In an Oklahoma case,
Governor Henry commuted the death sentence of Osbaldo Torres, in large
part because of international outrage that Torres, who was a Mexican citizen,
was not informed of his right to contact the Mexican Consulate following
his arrest.288 The consulate issue arose because, only weeks earlier, a decision
277. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
278. Ed Vogel, Board Allows Killer to Live, Las Vegas Rev.-J., Nov. 21, 2002, at 1A.
279. Id.
280. See Gwen Filosa, Mentally Disabled Inmate Spared, Times-Picayune (New Orleans,
La.), May 10, 2003, at 4.
281. See id.
282. Governor Spares Life of Inmate: Convicted Killer of Gary Couple Was to Be Executed
Next Week, Indianapolis Star, July 3, 2004, at A1.
283. See id.
284. See id.
285. Execution Halted in Georgia, Associated Press (June 16, 1988), http://
www.apnewsarchive.com/1988/Execution-Halted-In-Georgia/id-9e90dce69c67f98623cc83529b
dfffd3; see also Davis v. Kemp, 829 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir. 1987) (habeas corpus review); Davis v.
State, 252 S.E.2d 443 (Ga. 1979) (direct appeal).
286. Execution Halted in Georgia, supra note 285.
287. See Spraggins v. State, 364 S.E.2d 861 (Ga. 1988).
288. See Sean Murphy, Mexican Wins Clemency Plea in Oklahoma, Chi. Trib., May 14,
2004, at 14.
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by the International Court of Justice held that the United States had violated
the Vienna Convention in dozens of cases.289
2. DNA and Other New Evidence
Although new evidence of innocence may seem like the quintessential
reason for clemency, there were only six cases in which governors commuted
death sentences because of new evidence that came to light after the conclu-
sion of direct review.
In 2003, Governor Taft of Ohio relied in part on new DNA evidence to
commute the death sentence of Jerome Campbell.290 Following the enact-
ment of a DNA testing law in 2001,291 the defense was able to show that
blood on Campbell’s shoes was his own, not the victim’s.292 When the Ohio
Supreme Court denied Campbell a new trial based on this evidence, Taft
commuted the sentence to life without parole.293
Governor Batt of Idaho commuted the death sentence of Donald Paradis
in 1996 because there was “some element of doubt” surrounding Paradis’s
guilt.294 While Batt did not specify why he was granting clemency, a spokes-
man for the Idaho Commission of Pardons and Parole said that while the
commission still believed Paradis was guilty, evidence presented at his clem-
ency hearing had cast some doubt on this conclusion.295 At the clemency
hearing, Paradis’s attorneys focused on a blood analysis.296 Paradis’s earlier
appeals did not mention the blood test, and it appears that this test occurred
after the conclusion of direct appeals.297
On his last day in office in 1994, Virginia Governor Wilder commuted
the death sentence of Earl Washington Jr. A few months before the clemency
decision, a new DNA test indicated that “sperm found in the victim identi-
fied a genetic trait that could not have come from Washington or [the vic-
tim’s] husband.”298 Because that type of DNA testing did not exist at the
289. Torres v. State, No. PCD-04-442, 2004 WL 3711623, at *1 (Okla. Crim. App. May 13,
2004).
290. Sharon Turco, Governor Taft Grants Campbell Clemency, Cincinnati Enquirer,
June 27, 2003, at A1.
291. David Wells, Editorial, Why Campbell Gets to Live, Cincinnati Enquirer, June 27,
2003, at B6.
292. Turco, supra note 290.
293. Id.
294. Death Sentence Commuted, Seattle Times, May 25, 1996, at A6, available at http://
community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19960525&slug=2331127.
295. Idaho Inmate May Get Off Death Row, Seattle Times, May 18, 1996, at A6, available
at http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19960518&slug=2329864.
296. Id.
297. See State v. Paradis, 676 P.2d 31, 34–38 (Idaho 1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1220
(1984).
298. Peter Baker, Death-Row Inmate Gets Clemency, Wash. Post, Jan. 15, 1994, at A1 (“In
October, a DNA test on sperm found in the victim identified a genetic trait that could not
have come from Washington or her husband, leading [the attorney general] to announce that
he had doubts about Washington’s guilt.”).
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conclusion of Washington’s direct appeals,299 the clemency determination
likely would not have been the same years earlier.
In 1991, Wilder granted a conditional pardon to Joseph Giarratano, who
had attracted international attention based on his claims of innocence.300
Giarratano had been convicted of rape and murder, but new psychiatric
evidence suggested that he might have made up all or part of the confession
used to convict him.301 The new evidence came to light after his direct ap-
peals ended in 1980.302
In 1979, Florida Governor Graham commuted the death sentence of
Learie Leo Alford. Alford’s direct appeals were rejected, and the Supreme
Court denied certiorari in 1976.303 The following year, an eyewitness re-
canted his testimony and told authorities that the true killer was larger than
Alford.304 Although the commutation decision could have been made almost
two years earlier based on the recanted testimony, it still would have oc-
curred after the conclusion of direct appeals.
Finally, on President Clinton’s last day in office, he commuted the death
sentence of David Ronald Chandler, who was sentenced to death in 1991
under the federal drug kingpin law.305 A year after Chandler’s direct appeals
ended306 but well before the 2001 commutation, the star witness signed an
affidavit indicating that he had lied.307
3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
As explained earlier,308 ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be
considered after the habeas process rather than before it. Ineffective assis-
tance claims are usually first raised in state habeas proceedings. A new attor-
ney typically takes over the case and builds a record showing how trial
counsel performed poorly. In many cases, the state habeas court holds a full
evidentiary hearing that creates a detailed record of the quality of counsel.
Yet there were only three cases in which commutations were made because
299. For a discussion of the development of DNA testing and the timing of Washington’s
case, see Garrett, supra note 6, at 219–22.
300. Jim Clardy, Wilder Halts Giarratano’s Trip to Chair, Wash. Times, Feb. 20, 1991, at
A1.
301. Joseph Williams, Attorney General Turns Down Giarratano’s Plea for New Trial, Rich-
mond Times-Dispatch, Feb. 21, 1991, at A1.
302. See Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 266 S.E.2d 94 (Va. 1980). It appears that Giar-
ratano never petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari on direct review.
303. Alford v. Florida, 428 U.S. 912 (1976).
304. Radelet & Zsembik, supra note 78, at 306.
305. John Solomon, In Final Act, Clinton Issues Pardons, Wash. Post (Jan. 20, 2001, 4:25
PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/aponline/20010120/aponline162547_000.htm.
306. See Chandler v. United States, 512 U.S. 1227 (1994).
307. Bill Rankin & Rhonda Cook, Execution Set in U.S. Drug Case; But Witness Says He
Lied to Convict Alabama Man, Atlanta J.-Const., Mar. 14, 1995, at E1.
308. See supra notes 169–170 and accompanying text.
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of ineffective assistance allegations developed after the conclusion of direct
review.
In 2007, Kentucky Governor Fletcher commuted the death sentence of
Jeffrey Leonard based on ineffective assistance of counsel.309 Leonard did not
raise an ineffectiveness claim in his direct appeal;310 once he had new counsel
in his habeas proceedings, he focused on ineffective assistance as a reason to
vacate his conviction and death sentence.311 Thus, while the ineffectiveness
claim was known almost two decades before Leonard’s commutation, it was
not well developed prior to the conclusion of direct appeals.
Also in 2007, Governor Bredesen of Tennessee commuted the death sen-
tence of Michael Boyd because of ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial
and postconviction stages of Boyd’s case.312 According to news reports, “no
court [ever] reviewed the merits of Boyd’s claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel because his post-conviction lawyer initially failed to raise it on ap-
peal, which kept it from being raised later.”313 Accordingly, the ineffective-
ness issue would not have been fully developed for review if a clemency
determination had been made at the conclusion of direct appeals.
Finally, in 2005, just days before the end of his term, Governor Kernan
of Indiana commuted the death sentence of Michael Daniels.314 Kernan of-
fered a number of reasons for his decision, including ineffective assistance of
counsel.315 The ineffective assistance claim had not been litigated in Daniels’s
direct appeal in 1983, but it was thoroughly considered in his state habeas
petition in 1988.316 The Daniels case thus does not support the argument
that clemency can be addressed at the end of direct review. It does demon-
strate, however, that clemency could be considered far earlier in the process.
The thorough state habeas corpus decision in Daniels’s case was issued in
1988, over seventeen years before Kernan’s clemency decision.
4. Changes Related to the Defendant
In two Virginia cases, governors commuted death sentences because of
changes in the defendant’s condition—mental illness and rehabilitation—
since the trial. This information was unavailable at the conclusion of direct
review.
309. See 3 Have Sentences Commuted, Ky. Post (Covington, Ky.), Dec. 11, 2007, at A2.
310. Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 744 S.W.2d 407, 410 (Ky. 1987).
311. See Slaughter v. Parker, 187 F. Supp. 2d 755, 827 (W.D. Ky. 2001).
312. Richard Locker, Bredesen Spares Killer’s Life, Com. Appeal (Memphis, Tenn.), Sept.
15, 2007, at B1, available at http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2007/sep/15/bredesen-
spares-killers-life/.
313. Id.
314. Richard D. Walton, Kernan Commutes Man’s Death Sentence, Indianapolis Star,
Jan. 8, 2005, at A1.
315. Id. Kernan also pointed to Daniels’s mental illness, questions about whether he was
the triggerman, and lighter sentences for codefendants.
316. Compare Daniels v. State, 528 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. 1988) (state postconviction petition),
with Daniels v. State, 453 N.E.2d 160 (Ind. 1983) (direct appeal decision).
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In 2008, Virginia Governor Kaine commuted Percy Walton’s death sen-
tence to life without parole because “one cannot reasonably conclude that
Walton is fully aware of the punishment he is about to suffer and why he is
to suffer it.”317 The degree of Walton’s mental illness was apparently not as
advanced at the time of trial and was not raised in his direct appeals.318
In 1997, Governor Allen of Virginia commuted the death sentence of
William Ira Saunders.319 Allen said that he was “swayed by a prosecutor and
judge who said Saunders is not the same violent man sentenced to death”
for the 1989 murder, and “it would be in the ‘best interest of justice’ for
Saunders’ sentence to be commuted to life in prison.”320 The judge in Saun-
ders’s trial wrote that he had initially imposed the death penalty in this case
because of Saunders’s violent conduct in jail, but the judge determined that
Saunders’s improved behavior in prison showed that he was no longer a
continuing threat.321 It is unlikely that the prosecutor and judge would have
reached the same conclusion about Saunders’s improved behavior at the
conclusion of direct appeals.
5. Outside Influence
Finally, after allowing twenty-six executions to proceed, Missouri Gov-
ernor Carnahan commuted the death sentence of Darrell Mease after Pope
John Paul II personally requested the commutation.322 The pope was coinci-
dentally in Saint Louis at the same time that Mease was to be executed, and
Carnahan acknowledged that the commutation “was more out of respect for
the pope” than because of the facts of the case.323 Because the governor was
moved by an unusual series of events, the same result would not have oc-
curred at the conclusion of direct appeals.
II. The Case for Threshold Clemency Decisions Following
Direct Appeals
Governors and pardon boards almost always leave capital clemency de-
cisions until an execution date is looming. Yet as Section I.A demonstrated,
for most commutations, the crucial information was known years or even
decades before the last-minute clemency decision.
317. Jerry Markon, Va. Governor Commutes Death Sentence: Kaine Gives Murderer Life,
Calls Inmate Mentally Unfit, Wash. Post, June 10, 2008, at B1.
318. Walton v. Commonwealth, 501 S.E.2d 134 (Va. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1046
(1998).
319. Death Sentence Commuted, Wash. Post, Sept. 16, 1997, at B3.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Terry Ganey, Carnahan Spares Murderer’s Life: Brief Meeting with Pope Led Governor
to Cancel Execution; ‘It’s A Miracle!’ Lawyer Says, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 29, 1999, at
A1.
323. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Leaving clemency until the end of the case is imprudent for at least
three reasons: (1) it is extremely inefficient, leading to hundreds of years of
needless litigation; (2) it creates an information cascade that makes gover-
nors and pardon boards less likely to grant clemency at all; and (3) it is
harmful to the victims’ families, who endure years of appeals and habeas
petitions only to have the inmate escape execution at the last minute. I ex-
plore these three rationales below.
A. Efficient Clemency: Saving Hundreds of Years of Wasted Litigation
The Supreme Court has described clemency as a “matter of grace.”324
This Article does not suggest otherwise. Governors and pardon boards
should remain free to grant or deny clemency as they please. At the same
time, however, clemency serves as an integral part of the capital punishment
process in every state with capital punishment.325 The Court has called clem-
ency the “fail safe” of the criminal justice system.326 There is no reason that
such an important stage of the process should operate in a needlessly ineffi-
cient manner.
1. The Raw Numbers
As detailed in Section I.A, it is clear that in a majority of cases (thirty-
five of sixty-six), the capital commutations could have been made based on
the same information at the end of direct review. And as explained in Sec-
tion I.B, governors probably had the necessary information to grant clem-
ency at the end of direct review in an additional six cases. In most cases,
governors and pardon boards waited until the last minute to make clemency
decisions based on information that had been readily available for years or
even decades.
Quantifying the inefficiency is difficult: How much effort was spent on
the state and federal habeas petitions in cases where the necessary informa-
tion was already available? How many briefs were filed? How many parale-
gals, defense attorneys, prosecutors, law clerks, judges, and other lawyers
needlessly worked on the cases? It is impossible to answer these questions for
certain, but one benchmark is available: the number of years of litigation
between the conclusion of direct review and the commutation.
Taking only the cases from Section I.A, where it was completely clear
that the commutation was based on information known by the conclusion
of direct appeals, more than 299 years of total litigation could have been
avoided. In some cases—for example, in those of Ronald Post and Edward
Jerome Harbison—a clemency decision at the end of direct review would
have eliminated more than two decades of litigation.
324. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 281 (1998).
325. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 414 (1993).
326. Id. at 415 (rejecting freestanding claims of actual innocence because clemency is the
“fail safe” to deal with such claims).
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Table 1.
Cases in Which Clemency Could Have Been Granted
at the End of Direct Review
Defendant Name
Direct Appeal 
End Date Commutation Date
Time Between Appeal 
and Commutation
Shawn Hawkins 11/15/1993 6/8/2011 17 years, 7 months
Eugene Colvin-El 10/1/1984 6/7/2000 15 years, 8 months
Henry Lee Lucas 3/22/1989 6/26/1998 9 years, 3 months
Anson Avery Maynard 10/29/1984 1/10/1992 7 years, 2 months
Ronald Monroe 9/8/1983 8/17/1989 5 years, 11 months
Doris Ann Foster 6/30/1986 1/21/1987 0 years, 6 months
Jesse Rutledge 4/21/1980 4/19/1983 3 years, 0 months
Christopher Hallman 10/4/1976 6/26/1979 2 years, 9 months
Joseph Murphy 10/4/1993 9/26/2011 18 years, 0 months
John Jeffrey Eley 6/27/1997 7/10/2012 15 years, 0 months
Arthur Baird 10/4/1993 8/29/2005 11 years, 11 months
Kevin Stanford 8/30/1989 12/8/2003 14 years, 3 months
Alexander Williams 8/30/1989 2/25/2002 12 years, 6 months
Calvin Swann 10/3/1994 5/13/1999 4 years, 7 months
Kevin Keith 4/6/1998 9/2/2010 12 years, 5 months
Kevin Young 5/29/2001 7/24/2008 7 years, 2 months
Kenneth Foster 4/3/2000 8/30/2007 7 years, 5 months
Phillip Dewitt Smith 11/16/1987 4/9/2001 13 years, 5 months
Marcus Carter 5/30/1995 11/21/2000 5 years, 6 months
Wendell Flowers 2/23/1998 12/15/1999 1 year, 10 months
Michael Salvatore 11/26/1979 5/19/1981 1 year, 6 months
Richard Henry Gibson 6/5/1978 5/6/1980 1 year, 11 months
Charles Harris Hill 9/28/1976 9/29/1977 1 year, 0 months
Willie James Hall 11/26/1990 1/26/2004 13 years, 2 months
William Neal Moore 10/4/1976 8/21/1990 13 years, 11 months
Ronald Post 4/18/1988 12/18/2012 24 years, 8 months
Robert Bacon Jr. 2/21/1995 10/2/2001 6 years, 7 months
Robin Lovitt 10/1/2001 11/29/2005 4 years, 2 months
Charlie Mason Alston Jr. 2/26/1996 1/10/2002 5 years, 10 months
Edward Jerome Harbison 5/27/1986 1/12/2011 24 years, 8 months
Guinevere Garcia 3/23/1995 1/16/1996 0 years, 10 months
David Cameron Keith 3/23/1988 12/29/1988 0 years, 9 months
Robert Gattis 10/3/1994 1/17/2012 17 years, 3 months
Jeffrey Hill 1/16/1996 2/12/2009 13 years, 1 month
Darrell Hoy 10/16/1978 1/9/1980 1 year, 3 months
Total 299 years, 5 months
The total amount of wasted litigation rises considerably if we add the six
cases from Section I.B, in which the basis for the commutation was probably
known at the end of direct review. These six cases add another seventy-six
years of unnecessary habeas review.
Table 2.
Cases in Which Clemency Probably Could Have Been Granted
at the End of Direct Review
Defendant Name
Direct Appeal
End Date Commutation Date
Time Between Appeal 
and Commutation
Sidney Cornwell 2/22/2000 11/15/2010 10 years, 9 months
Gaile Owens 5/16/1988 7/13/2010 22 years, 2 months
Bobby Ray Fretwell 5/19/1986 2/5/1999 12 years, 9 months
Judith Ann Neelley 3/9/1987 1/15/1999 11 years, 10 months
Joseph Payne 1/11/1988 11/7/1996 8 years, 10 months
Herbert Bassette 4/19/1982 1/23/1992 9 years, 9 months
Total 76 years, 1 month
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2. The Story of Habeas Evolution
The raw numbers tell a powerful story, but the case for a threshold
clemency decision becomes even clearer when we consider the development
of habeas corpus law over the last half-century. As explained below, the Su-
preme Court has expanded the substantive law that can provide the basis for
habeas relief. This broadening of the law has given inmates more reasons to
file habeas petitions and presented courts with more issues to resolve. At the
same time, both the Supreme Court and Congress have tightened the proce-
dural rules for bringing habeas claims, and Congress has raised the stan-
dards for inmates to win on the merits. This means more litigation over
whether issues have been preserved, fewer cases being decided on the merits,
and a lower chance that inmates will win the merits decisions. In short, most
capital habeas petitioners—even those with compelling reasons for why they
should not be executed—are likely to spend many years litigating procedural
and substantive issues that they are unlikely to win in court. Although we
are a long way from federal habeas review in capital cases becoming “full of
sound and fury, [s]ignifying nothing,”327 we are moving in that direction.328
And this gradual move drastically delays commutation decisions.
The starting point for the habeas maze is Brown v. Allen, in which the
Supreme Court opened the door for state prisoners to file habeas claims in
federal court even if their claims had already been litigated in state court.329
With the exception of Fourth Amendment claims, the Court has left the
door open for any type of federal constitutional violation to be the basis for
a habeas petition.330 And as substantive criminal procedure has expanded,
the number of substantive claims that can serve as the basis for a habeas
petition has also expanded. For instance, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Court
developed the Brady doctrine, which requires prosecutors to turn over
favorable, material evidence,331 even if the defense has not requested it.332
The introduction of this doctrine created a fertile ground for habeas corpus
litigation. During the Warren Court revolution, the Court announced the
supposedly simple Miranda doctrine but later vastly complicated it with
dozens of other decisions.333 In 2002, the Court outlawed the execution of
the mentally challenged but left undecided—and therefore made the focus
327. William Shakespeare, Macbeth act 5, sc. 5.
328. I do not want to suggest that habeas corpus is not valuable in capital cases. Troubling
death sentences are still thrown out on habeas review because of Brady claims, ineffective
assistance of counsel findings, and for other reasons. See infra notes 331–338 and accompany-
ing text.
329. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
330. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (forbidding habeas review of Fourth Amend-
ment claims if there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in state court).
331. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
332. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110–11 (1976).
333. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); George C. Thomas III, Lost in the Fog of
Miranda, 64 Hastings L.J. 1501, 1505 (2013) (describing Miranda as a “vast doctrinal web”).
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of much habeas litigation334—what it actually means to be mentally chal-
lenged. And, of course, the Court recognized a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel in 1984,335 and in recent years it has expanded the claim to cover
immigration advice336 as well as defective plea negotiations,337 all of which
are the subject of habeas litigation.338 In short, there is a lot more substantive
law for habeas petitioners to point to in claiming that their death sentences
violate the Constitution.
More substantive law now runs head on into greater procedural obsta-
cles. From 1963 until 1977, the Court allowed state prisoners to file federal
habeas claims even if they had failed to exhaust state remedies, as long as
they had not deliberately bypassed the state courts.339 In Wainwright v. Sykes,
however, the Court drastically switched course and required prisoners to
demonstrate cause and prejudice for any procedural default,340 a much
higher burden. The Court also imposed limits on successive petitions
(bringing the same claim more than once)341 and abusive petitions (failing to
raise a claim in a previous petition).342 In 1996, Congress enacted the An-
titerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) and made the proce-
dural hurdles even more difficult. AEDPA scaled back gateway claims in
which petitioners could use innocence to overcome procedural obstacles.343
It also established, for the first time, a statute of limitations for federal
habeas petitions.344 When an inmate surmounts all of these hurdles and fi-
nally reaches the merits, AEDPA imposes yet another obstacle. In addition to
showing a constitutional violation, the inmate must demonstrate either that
the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable ap-
plication of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States” or that the state court’s decision was “based on
334. See John H. Blume et al., An Empirical Look at Atkins v. Virginia and Its Application
in Capital Cases, 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 627, 628 (2009) (finding that at least 234 death-row inmates
filed claims under Atkins, although noting that the total number amounts to only 7 percent of
death-row inmates); Lee Kovarsky, Original Habeas Redux, 97 Va. L. Rev. 61, 93 (2011)
(“[N]ew and retroactive capital eligibility rules, such as the Atkins v. Virginia bar on executing
mentally retarded offenders, are frequently the bases for claims in successive petitions.”).
335. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
336. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
337. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
338. Tom Zimpleman, Essay, The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Era, 63 S.C. L. Rev. 425,
439 (2011) (arguing that ineffective assistance claims have “come to dominate habeas corpus
doctrine”).
339. Faye v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
340. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
341. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
342. McKleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
343. Lee Kovarsky, Death Ineligibility and Habeas Corpus, 95 Cornell L. Rev. 329,
340–41 (2010).
344. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2012).
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an unreasonable determination of the facts.”345 That standard is very diffi-
cult to meet.
All of this is not to say that habeas corpus is not valuable. The “Great
Writ” remains the primary bulwark against unconstitutional detention. But
its utility is far less than it was in decades past. In the early 1970s, “capital
murder defendants enjoyed a more than fifty percent success rate in federal
habeas corpus litigation.”346 As time went on, however, the percentage began
to drop. In a study of pre-AEDPA cases from 1973 to 1995, Professor James
Liebman and other leading scholars find that the “overall reversal rate for
federal habeas cases is 40%.”347 In subsequent work, Liebman recognizes that
“[g]iven Congress’s adoption of legislation in 1996 reducing federal prison-
ers’ access to federal habeas corpus review, it is likely that the reversal rate in
federal court has declined recently.”348 Indeed, a recent study by Professor
King and colleagues that looks at 267 capital cases filed between 2000 and
2002 finds that less than 13 percent received habeas relief from a federal
district court.349 Importantly, while finding that relief had declined, King
and her colleagues discovered that “[e]ach capital habeas filing appears to be
taking at least twice as long to finish, on average, than prior to AEDPA.”350
In short, we know that federal habeas review is less beneficial to death-
row inmates now than it was twenty years ago, perhaps much less so. We
also know that habeas review takes longer than it did twenty years ago. Fi-
nally, we know that before the Supreme Court drastically expanded habeas
corpus access to state prisoners in the 1950s, governors and pardon boards
considered clemency at the end of direct review, and it was much more
widely exercised.351
Not surprisingly, one of the leading commentators to study capital
habeas proposes that it be dramatically scaled back. Liebman suggests that in
345. Id. § 2254(d). For a detailed review of federal habeas corpus (and the obstacles to it),
see Brandon L. Garrett & Lee Kovarsky, Federal Habeas Corpus: Executive Deten-
tion and Post-Conviction Litigation (2013).
346. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal
Justice, 107 Yale L.J. 1, 43 (1997).
347. Jeffrey Fagan et al., Getting to Death: Fairness and Efficiency in the
Processing and Conclusion of Death Penalty Cases After Furman 56 (2004), available
at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/203935.pdf; James S. Liebman et al., A Broken
System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973–1995, at 6 (2000).
348. Liebman & Clarke, supra note 19, at 337 n.415.
349. Nancy J. King et al., Final Technical Report: Habeas Litigation in U.S. Dis-
trict Courts: An Empirical Study of Habeas Corpus Cases Filed by State Prisoners
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, at 61 (2007),
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf.
350. Id. at 60. The authors are careful to note that “[i]t is not known whether AEDPA has
had any effect on total processing time for all habeas challenges filed by a given death row
inmate.” Id.
351. See Bedau, supra note 17, at 262–66.
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exchange for procedural safeguards, such as videotaped confessions and bet-
ter charge screening, as well as more robust direct review, “capital defend-
ants . . . agree to give up state post-conviction review and a significant
amount of federal habeas review.”352
I do not suggest scaling back state or federal habeas review. But by start-
ing from the same premise—that habeas is incredibly time consuming and
inefficient—this Article offers the modest proposal to insert a threshold
clemency determination before any state or federal habeas proceedings
begin.
B. An Earlier Clemency Decision Might Increase Commutations
Many commentators have bemoaned the decline of executive clemency,
both in the capital353 and noncapital354 context. The traditional explanation
for the decline is that tough-on-crime politics has unduly invaded the crimi-
nal justice process and made it impossible for governors and pardon boards
to grant mercy.355 In a world with 24-hour news cycles and 140-character
tweets, it is difficult for political actors to make nuanced decisions while still
seeking reelection. While the conventional explanation is very plausible, it is
possible that the lengthy habeas corpus process could also be playing a role
in clemency’s decline.
1. The Full and Fair Access Excuse
First, the sheer length of the habeas process could be signaling to gover-
nors and pardon boards that inmates have already had a fair shake and that
in-depth review is not needed.356 Governors sometimes invoke an inmate’s
352. James S. Liebman, Opting for Real Death Penalty Reform, 63 Ohio St. L.J. 315,
332–34 (2002). Other habeas experts would not go so far. While arguing for a dramatic reduc-
tion of noncapital habeas review, Professors King and Hoffman maintain that there is “a con-
tinuing need for broad habeas jurisdiction in capital cases.” Nancy J. King & Joseph L.
Hoffman, Habeas for the Twenty-First Century: Uses, Abuses, and the Future of
the Great Writ 149 (2011). King and Hoffman argue for less stringent procedural default
rules and for a greater focus on protecting “against the execution of an innocent.” Id. at
149–52.
353. See, e.g., Cara H. Drinan, Clemency in a Time of Crisis, 28 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1123,
1124–25 (2012).
354. For an analysis of the federal system, see Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight of the
Pardon Power, 100 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1169 (2010), and Douglas A. Berman, Turning
Hope-and-Change Talk into Clemency Action for Nonviolent Drug Offenders, 36 New Eng. J. on
Crim. & Civ. Confinement 59 (2010).
355. See, e.g., Michael A.G. Korengold et al., And Justice for Few: The Collapse of the Capi-
tal Clemency System in the United States, 20 Hamline L. Rev. 349, 363–65 (1996).
356. As Professors Carol and Jordan Steiker recognized almost twenty years ago, this is a
pervasive problem with capital punishment regulation. The Court’s considerable involvement
in capital punishment “creates an impression of enormous regulatory effort but achieves negli-
gible regulatory effects.” Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflec-
tions on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 Harv. L. Rev.
355, 360 (1995).
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“full and fair access to the courts” as a primary reason to deny clemency. For
instance, Governor Bush of Texas stated that he would grant clemency only
if the inmate were innocent or had not received full and fair access to the
courts.357 Similarly, in Missouri, Governor Ashcroft remarked that “[i]t
would have been arrogant and irresponsible of me to second-guess the peo-
ple and the court system by arbitrarily reversing the decision of unmistaken
juries and judges.”358 Other governors have similarly relied on access to the
courts as a reason for denying clemency.359 Yet access to the courts does not
prove that it is just and wise to execute an inmate.360 It only proves that there
was no properly preserved and cognizable legal violation that required a
remedy on direct or postconviction review.361
By pointing to the lengthy review process, governors can convince the
public (and perhaps themselves) that there is no need for their thorough
involvement because the courts have already eliminated any prospect of a
wrongful execution. As I have explained elsewhere, this diffusion of respon-
sibility has contributed to the decline of executive clemency.362 Of course, as
long as there is judicial review of death sentences, some diffusion of respon-
sibility between the courts and the clemency decisionmaker is inevitable. But
it is harder for governors and pardon boards to point the finger at courts
when most habeas review has not yet occurred and when the governors have
357. T. Christian Miller, Race Issues Raised in Latest Texas Death Penalty Appeal, L.A.
Times, June 29, 2000, at A22, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2000/jun/29/news/mn-
46186.
358. Cathleen Burnett, Justice Denied: Clemency Appeals in Death Penalty
Cases 161 (2002).
359. E.g., Lawrence Buser, Sundquist Says ‘No’ to Workman, Com. Appeal (Memphis,
Tenn.), Mar. 28, 2001, at A1 (noting that Tennessee Governor Sundquist denied clemency in
part because “ ‘I am confident that he has had adequate access to the courts.’ ”); John Moritz,
Woman on Death Row Gets Reprieve, Fort Worth Star-Telegram, Dec. 2, 2004, at A1 (re-
porting that Texas Governor Perry said that “he based his decision in Newton’s case on
whether she had been given ample access to the courts”); Tom Sherwood, Robb: Final Judge on
Life, Death, Wash. Post, May 9, 1985, at VA1 (reporting that Virginia Governor Robb stated
that in reviewing cases for executive clemency, “his main role is to make certain that a con-
demned person has had full access to the courts”).
360. As Justice Kennedy has recognized, “[a]mong its benign if too-often ignored objects,
the clemency power can correct injustices that the ordinary criminal process seems unable or
unwilling to consider.” Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 399 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see
also Sarat & Hussain, supra note 2, at 1309 (explaining that the full and fair access rationale
“leave[s] little, if any, room to consider mental illness or incompetence, childhood physical or
sexual abuse, remorse, [or] rehabilitation” (quoting Alan Berlow, The Texas Clemency Memos,
Atlantic Monthly, July–Aug. 2003, at 91, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/
2003/07/berlow.htm) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
361. In some instances, judges are required to uphold cases that they personally believe to
be unjust. These judges occasionally advocate for clemency. See Joanna M. Huang, Note, Cor-
recting Mandatory Injustice: Judicial Recommendation of Executive Clemency, 60 Duke L.J. 131,
156 (2010); cf. Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 628 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Although Williams’s
good works and accomplishments since incarceration may make him a worthy candidate for
the exercise of gubernatorial discretion, they are not matters that we in the federal judiciary
are at liberty to take into consideration in our review of Williams’s habeas corpus petition.”).
362. See Gershowitz, supra note 48.
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been specifically tasked with reviewing a death-penalty case in the middle of
the appellate scheme.
2. The Information Cascade Problem
A second, and related, problem with placing the clemency decision at
the end of the lengthy habeas process is that it may create an information
cascade that reduces the likelihood of governors or pardon boards reaching a
different conclusion than do the courts. An information cascade “occurs
when it is optimal for an individual, having observed the actions of those
ahead of him, to follow the behavior of the preceding individual without
regard to his own information.”363 Examples of this situation abound. Stu-
dents want to attend a particular university because it is popular; an em-
ployer declines to hire a prospective employee after learning that two other
businesses turned down his application; no one wants to eat in a restaurant
because it is empty.364 Upon seeing many other people reaching a conclu-
sion, a person finds it much easier to ignore his own information and follow
the herd.365
There is already a strong possibility that information cascades exist in
the criminal justice system. In the typical case, police decide to arrest a sus-
pect, the grand jury or prosecutor opts to charge him, the jury decides to
convict, and the state courts uphold his conviction. Even if there were no
habeas corpus review, the cascade might dissuade a governor from altering a
decision reached by so many people.
In many capital cases, the habeas process simply makes the possibility of
an information cascade much worse. By offering death-row inmates so many
bites at the state and federal habeas apple, the process may signal to the
governor366 that the decision should not be changed. Consider the difference
between the direct appellate process and the habeas process. In direct review,
a capital defendant typically has an automatic right of appeal to the state
supreme court and then he has the very unlikely chance that the U.S. Su-
preme Court will hear his case. At that point, his conviction is final. In the
habeas corpus process, by contrast, the petitioner (after his direct appeals
have already been rejected) seeks review from the state trial court and the
state appeals courts and then he files a petition for certiorari with the U.S.
363. Sushil Bikhchandani et al., A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as
Informational Cascades, 100 J. Pol. Econ. 992, 994 (1992).
364. For these and other examples, see Ward Farnsworth, The Legal Analyst: A
Toolkit for Thinking About Law 136 (2007).
365. See Abhijit V. Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q. J. Econ. 797,
798–99 (1992).
366. It is of course possible that judges can be unduly influenced by their predecessors’
opinions and thus become victims of the information cascade as well. For a skeptical assess-
ment, see Eric Talley, Precedential Cascades: An Appraisal, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 87, 132 (1999)
(concluding that it is “unlikely that information cascades present a significant impediment to
the judiciary”).
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Supreme Court. If that fails, he can file a habeas petition in the federal dis-
trict court and also seek review in the federal circuit court of appeals and the
U.S. Supreme Court. The habeas process thus adds at least six separate re-
view stages to the criminal justice process.367 If an inmate files an additional
successive habeas petition368 and loses, there will be an even longer cascade
before the case reaches the governor or pardon board.
Social science literature has documented that cascade behavior increases
with the number of previous agreements.369 In one study, all the subjects
joined the cascade by the time there had been seven previous decisions on
an issue.370 As one review of the literature puts it, “Decision makers are more
willing to agree with the choices of others, the more others there are who all
agree.”371 Or as another group of scholars put it more colorfully, “[T]he
longer the bandwagon continues, the more robust it becomes.”372 The
habeas process—because of its sheer length and numerous opportunities for
appeal—makes an information cascade more likely by the time it reaches the
clemency stage.
Additionally, researchers have found that strong-willed actors have a
better chance of resisting a cascade than weaker, less-informed actors. But
their studies indicate that even strong actors fall victim to the cascade once it
becomes too heavy. Professor Farnsworth explains as follows:
[T]he point of a cascade—the feature that makes it insidious—is that it
takes in the weaker and the stronger alike by enlisting them in order. A
strong onlooker who isn’t impressed by a consensus of two or three people
comes back later to find a consensus of two or three hundred, and this time
thinks there must be a solid basis for it after all; he starts to doubt his own
thinking. But the only development while he was gone was that others,
more easily impressed than he was, signed on to the emerging opinion and
so made it seem more dominant.373
As politicians, governors are the classic strong-willed actors who might
be able to break a cascade at an earlier stage. But placing clemency at the end
of numerous appeals and habeas petitions may make it difficult for even
strong-willed actors to resist the cascade.
367. For a good overview of the stages, including a helpful diagram, see Garrett & Ko-
varsky, supra note 345, at 170–73.
368. See supra text accompanying note 341. Successive petitions are filed in about 5 per-
cent of all capital habeas cases and are generally rejected. Kovarsky, supra note 343, at 339–41.
369. See, e.g., Lisa R. Anderson, Payoff Effects in Information Cascade Experiments, 39
Econ. Inquiry 609 (2001).
370. Anthony Ziegelmeyer et al., Fragility of Information Cascades: An Experimental Study
Using Elicited Beliefs, 13 Experimental Econ. 121, 123 (2010).
371. Dorothea Ku¨bler & Georg Weizsa¨cker, Are Longer Cascades More Stable?, 3 J. Eur.
Econ. Ass’n 330, 330 (2005).
372. Bikhchandani et al., supra note 363, at 993.
373. Farnsworth, supra note 364, at 137.
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I do not mean to suggest that we can eliminate the possibility of an
information cascade altogether by having governors and pardon boards con-
sider clemency before the habeas process begins. But decisionmakers may be
less susceptible to an information cascade at the end of direct review (typi-
cally after two appellate decisions) than at the end of the habeas process
when the case has been rejected by at least eight judicial decisions.
C. Moving Clemency to an Earlier Stage Benefits Victims’ Families
Beginning in the early 1990s, death penalty proponents and the media
began invoking closure as an independent justification for capital punish-
ment.374 Many scholars are critical of the focus on closure375 because of the
risk that focusing on victims will deny due process to the defendants and
lead to arbitrary death sentences.376 Another strand of criticism questions
whether the criminal justice system can even provide desirable therapeutic
closure for victims.377 I do not want to wade into the debate over the wisdom
of how much emphasis the criminal justice process should place on victims’
closure. I simply offer the logical deduction that if we are concerned about
closure in capital cases, granting clemency at the end of direct appeals is
preferable to granting it years or decades later at the end of the habeas
process.
There is no question that many murder victims’ families believe that
executing the offender will bring closure.378 But as Liebman has shown, an
enormous number of death sentences are reversed on appeal and habeas
review, often many years after conviction.379 This lengthy process creates tre-
mendous anxiety for many families.380 The husband of a murder victim de-
scribed the effect on the victim’s parents in this way: “Every time they hear
374. Jody Lynee´ Madeira, “Why Rebottle the Genie?”: Capitalizing on Closure in Death Pen-
alty Proceedings, 85 Ind. L.J. 1477, 1479–80 (2010).
375. As Professor Madeira explains, the “majority of scholars” see the focus on closure in
capital cases as a “grievous error.” Id. at 1489.
376. There is a wide literature. For some of the best writing on the risks to defendants, see
Susan A. Bandes, Victims, “Closure,” and the Sociology of Emotion, 72 Law & Contemp. Probs.
1, 1–2 (2009); Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 361, 393–402 (1996); Vik Kanwar, Capital Punishment as “Closure”: The Limits of a Vic-
tim-Centered Jurisprudence, 27 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 215, 248 (2001). For a counter-
point on the need for more victim involvement in the criminal justice process, see Stephanos
Bibas, The Machinery of Criminal Justice 83–107 (2012).
377. See Susan Bandes, When Victims Seek Closure: Forgiveness, Vengeance and the Role of
Government, 27 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1599, 1606 (2000).
378. The extent of closure varies, however. See Samuel R. Gross & Daniel J. Matheson,
What They Say at the End: Capital Victims’ Families and the Press, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 486
(2003).
379. James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 2030, 2052–57
(2000).
380. Margaret Vandiver, The Impact of the Death Penalty on the Families of Homicide Vic-
tims and of Condemned Prisoners, in America’s Experiment with Capital Punishment 613,
621 (James R. Acker et al., 2d ed. 2003).
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about another appeal, another delay, it throws them into a grave depression
. . . . I think it happens to all of us. We’re all thrown back to square one.”381
In New Jersey, the daughter of a murder victim remarked that “our current
system is most unjust for the victims and their loved ones. I can only hope
to save other families from the grief of the never-ending appellate pro-
cess.”382 In Maryland, a family member explained that “[w]hen they talk in
court about how brutally she was murdered, the pictures come back in your
mind. Then you finally get rid of them, and he wants an appeal again. There
is no closure with the death penalty for me and my family.”383
In a comparison of Texas (which has the death penalty) and Minnesota
(which does not), scholars found that victims’ families had more anxiety
about the appeals process in Texas. The families remarked on the long appel-
late process in Texas and the lack of transparency, both of which contributed
to a fear that the case would be overturned.384 One person explained as
follows:
We haven’t had a sense of justice. I feel like my life is on hold because it just
hasn’t been carried out . . . . When is it gonna be over? . . . [T]here are
other murders that happened in 1995 that they have already been put to
death. And ours is still lingering? Why aren’t things moving on? Why is
everything at a standstill?385
Last-minute commutations only exacerbate the suffering of the victim’s
family. For example, when Governor Kasich of Ohio commuted a death sen-
tence more than twenty years after conviction, the victim’s mother re-
sponded that “[i]f a man can spend 22 years in prison and still get clemency,
then the system ain’t working.”386 Recently, Kasich angered victims’ families
by commuting another death sentence more than two decades after convic-
tion without first alerting the families to his decision.387
If there will be no execution because of an eventual commutation, and if
closure is an important value to victims’ families, the commutation decision
should be made as early as is feasible. Ending the uncertainty of the process
381. Tom Gibbons, Victims Again: Survivors Suffer Through Capital Appeals, A.B.A. J.,
Sept. 1, 1988, at 64, 64.
382. N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm’n, New Jersey Death Penalty Study Commis-
sion Report 58 (2007), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/committees/dpsc_final.pdf.
383. Alyson R. Klein, Man Found Guilty Again, Balt. Sun, July 25, 2003, at 1B, available
at http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2003-07-25/news/0307250034_1_death-sentence-death-
penalty-conyers.
384. See Marilyn Peterson Armour & Mark S. Umbreit, Assessing the Impact of the Ulti-
mate Penal Sanction on Homicide Survivors: A Two State Comparison, 96 Marq. L. Rev. 1,
51–55 (2012).
385. Id. at 54.
386. Curnutte, supra note 29.
387. See Andrew Welsh-Huggins, Ohio Governor to Meet Murder Victim’s Family, Ft.
Wayne J. Gazette, Apr. 6, 2013, available at http://www.journalgazette.net/article/20130406/
NEWS11/304069966/1177/news11.
50 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 113:1
is extremely valuable to families, many of whom are criminal justice outsid-
ers without a keen sense of the nature of the process.388
D. Responding to the Major Objection
There is one obvious objection to the proposal to move the timing of
executive clemency: If clemency precedes the lengthy habeas process, why
would governors and pardon boards take the risk of commuting a death
sentence that might be overturned by the courts? Governors are political
actors who often have to run for reelection or might wish to seek another
elective office. And granting clemency to death-row inmates is not good
politics. If, as I have argued elsewhere,389 there is a diffusion of responsibility
in capital clemency, it will be difficult to encourage governors seriously to
consider clemency at the end of direct review. By the time a case makes its
way through the lengthy habeas process, another governor will be in office.
When the inmate asks the new governor to grant a last-minute commuta-
tion, the new governor—for both political and information-cascade rea-
sons—will likely deny commutation and simply point to the negative
decision at the threshold clemency stage. This is a powerful objection, al-
though not fatal by any means.
First, capital clemency has dramatically declined in more recent years
compared to the first half of the twentieth century. For instance, from 1920
to 1936, New York commuted 83 death sentences; from 1909 through 1954,
North Carolina commuted 229 death sentences.390 In examining the prac-
tices of only twelve states, Professor Bedau found more than 700 capital
commutations between 1900 and 1968.391 By contrast, from 1976 to 2013,
governors and pardon boards granted only 66 capital commutations based
on the particular circumstances of individual cases.392 A sizeable number of
these recent commutations came at the end of governors’ terms when they
no longer had to stand for reelection.393 Moreover, when we compare the 66
commutations with the more than 1,300 executions carried out during the
same period, it is clear that capital clemency is currently seldom used.394
388. See generally Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure,
81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 911, 923–31 (2006) (detailing the public’s general lack of understanding of
the criminal justice system).
389. Gershowitz, supra note 48.
390. Bedau, supra note 17, at 265.
391. Id.
392. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
393. See Laura M. Argys & H. Naci Mocan, Who Shall Live and Who Shall Die? An Analysis
of Prisoners on Death Row in the United States, 33 J. Legal Stud. 255, 280 (2004) (“We find
that if an inmate’s stay on death row ends at a point in time where the governor is a lame
duck, the probability of commutation increases significantly . . . .”); supra notes 65, 101, 192,
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Adding a threshold clemency determination thus creates very little risk that
governors will dispense less mercy than they do presently.
Second, there are modest signs that governors will not act in a purely
cynical and political manner. Ohio Governor Kasich, who is often men-
tioned as a presidential candidate,395 granted four commutations in 2011
and 2012.396 Other prominent governors, such as Robert Ehrlich in Mary-
land, Mike Huckabee in Arkansas, and Tim Kaine in Virginia, frequently
utilized their clemency power in noncapital cases (as well as in two death
penalty cases)397 with minimal political fallout.398 As Professor Barkow ex-
plains, “[U]sing the themes of redemption and forgiveness as tenets of relig-
ious faith or constitutional duty can, in turn, offer a competing political
narrative that may shield governors who exercise their pardon power from
attack.”399
Third, in five states—Connecticut, Georgia, Nebraska, Nevada, and
Utah—an independent pardon board has exclusive control over whether to
commute a death sentence.400 Over 200 inmates presently sit on death row in
these states,401 and clemency claims could be addressed at the end of direct
review with minimal political involvement.402
Finally, governors and pardon boards may be motivated by the potential
cost savings of acting prior to the habeas process. In an effort to save money
over the last decade, states have made criminal justice reforms that were
unthinkable only a short time ago.403 For example, states have repealed
mandatory-minimum sentencing laws, lowered maximum sentences, and
provided for drug treatment in lieu of incarceration.404 States have also
adopted more flexible parole and probation policies and expanded early-
395. E.g., Thomas Suddes, Kasich Might Fancy a Move Up in 2016, Plain Dealer (Cleve-
land, Ohio), Dec. 29, 2012, at G1, available at http://www.cleveland.com/opinion/index.ssf/
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396. See supra notes 29, 86, 90, 171 and accompanying text.
397. See supra notes 238, 317 and accompanying text.
398. Drinan, supra note 353, at 1145–47.
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ited Mar. 23, 2014).
402. Ironically, as Professor Heise observes, administrative clemency boards were created
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release programs.405 To balance budgets, states—including tough-on-crime
Texas406—have closed existing prisons and refused to build new facilities.407
A prominent group of conservative, law-and-order politicians has started
the “Right on Crime” movement to adopt sensible cost-cutting criminal jus-
tice reform.408 Perhaps most tellingly, five states abolished capital punish-
ment altogether between 2007 and 2012.409 As one prominent scholar
explains, “In each of those states, the cost of the death penalty—or at least
what the state was getting for the cost—played a critical role in the decision
to abandon capital punishment as the ultimate sanction.”410
All told, politicians (as well as the general public) are much more recep-
tive to cost arguments today than in the past. If politicians are willing to
reduce sentences, close prisons, and even abolish capital punishment alto-
gether, there is reason to be optimistic that governors will not reflexively
reject a threshold clemency determination that might save their states mil-
lions of dollars. Indeed, the governor of Michigan recently took cost into
account when commuting 133 noncapital cases.411
III. Implementing a Threshold Clemency Determination at the
End of Direct Review
The remaining questions pertain to implementation: Is there any legal
impediment to considering clemency at the end of direct review? And, if
not, how do you convince governors to undertake politically risky actions
that they could otherwise pass down the road to their successors?
The first question is easy. There is very little law specifying the timing of
clemency review. While there are some restrictions on the clemency
power—such as forbidding a governor from granting clemency for the
crime of treason412—state constitutions and statutes do not typically impose
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40 Ariz. St. L.J. 47, 82 (2008).
406. Brandi Grissom, Prison Closing Pleases City and Helps State Budget, N.Y. Times, Aug.
19, 2011, at 19A, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/19/us/19ttprison.html.
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limits on when governors and pardon boards can consider clemency.413 In-
deed, in a few states, the law actually seems specifically to contemplate the
possibility of early clemency decisions. For instance, Colorado law states that
“[t]he governor is hereby fully authorized, when he deems it proper and
advisable and consistent with the public interests and the rights and interests
of the condemned, to commute the sentence in any [capital] case.”414 In
California, the governor can grant clemency anytime after conviction and
even before the sentence is handed down.415 In other states, courts have held
that governors are free to grant clemency while the judicial process is ongo-
ing.416 Of course, some parole boards may have internal rules specifying the
timing of clemency review,417 but these rules could easily be amended by the
board itself or abrogated by statute.
The second issue—convincing governors and pardon boards to consider
clemency after direct review—is more difficult. Governors and pardon
boards could, on their own initiative, simply take it upon themselves to con-
sider clemency before the conclusion of direct appeals. A handful of gover-
nors have done something similar by granting blanket commutations that
emptied death row.418 Rather than going this far, decisionmakers—particu-
larly politically insulated pardon boards or lame-duck governors—might
look on a case-by-case basis at inmates who do not yet have impending
execution dates. While this might happen in a few instances, it is unlikely to
occur on a wide scale. Politicians typically want to be reelected or at least to
protect their legacies, which makes threshold clemency decisions unlikely.
A second solution would be for the legislature to require a threshold
clemency determination at the end of direct review. While there are rela-
tively few statutory restrictions and requirements on clemency practice, they
do exist. For instance, the Tennessee Code requires governors to provide the
general assembly with the reasons for commuting any sentences.419 When
Governor Graham of Florida commuted a few death sentences in the 1980s,
the Florida legislature attempted to regulate the governor’s clemency power
by considering (and nearly passing) a bill with a reporting requirement simi-
lar to Tennessee’s.420
413. Acker & Lanier, supra note 3, at 222 (“Legislative initiatives specifying fact-finding
procedures for capital case clemency decisions in virtually all jurisdictions are either nonexis-
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State legislatures could simply pass a bill requiring a threshold clemency
review after direct review. A lame duck-governor—particularly one who
wants to fix the dysfunctional capital punishment system but doesn’t want
to risk his legacy by commuting any particular sentence—might be willing
to sign such a law. This scenario might be particularly plausible if the outgo-
ing governor is of a different political party than the incoming governor.
A third, and more dramatic, proposal would be for Congress to alter the
habeas statute to require a threshold clemency determination before an in-
mate could pursue federal habeas relief.421 Under the current federal habeas
statute, “an application for a writ of habeas corpus . . . shall not be granted
unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in
the courts of the State.”422 An inmate therefore cannot pursue federal habeas
relief until he has exhausted his state appeals and state postconviction op-
tions. Clemency is not a judicial remedy and therefore need not be ex-
hausted before the federal habeas process. Congress could simply change the
statute to provide that federal habeas corpus “shall not be granted unless it
appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts
of the State, as well as a threshold clemency review.”
Congress has strong incentives to make this amendment to the habeas
statute. The federal courts are clogged with habeas cases, and capital cases
are typically the most time consuming. If a threshold clemency determina-
tion kept only a handful of capital cases out of the federal habeas process, it
would save the federal courts (including judges, clerks, court staff, and attor-
neys) both time and money. Moreover, the savings would be amplified in
light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Harbison v. Bell, which held
that the federal habeas statute allows the appointment of counsel to indigent
defendants in state clemency hearings following failed federal habeas
review.423
Conclusion
The capital clemency system is broken. Governors and pardon boards
dispense mercy far less often than in the recent past. And when they do
commute death sentences, governors and pardon boards typically wait until
the last minute, even though the relevant information was usually known for
years or even decades before the commutation. This Article demonstrates
that in the majority of cases, it was possible for governors and pardon
boards to make a clemency determination at the conclusion of direct review.
Earlier commutations would soften the blow to the victims’ families, and
conducting clemency review at the end of direct appeals would also mitigate
the information-cascade effect and possibly resuscitate the use of clemency
in the United States. Most importantly, analyzing clemency before state and
federal habeas corpus would be far more efficient. This Article shows that
421. I am grateful to Professor Alan Meese for suggesting this approach.
422. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).
423. 556 U.S. 180 (2009).
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last-minute commutations in dozens of cases resulted in nearly 300 years of
needless litigation. In a time when states are closing prisons and even abol-
ishing capital punishment to save money, governors and pardon boards
would be wise to consider clemency at the end of direct review. Changing
course in this way could prevent the thousands of hours of litigation and
millions of dollars in expenses that are typically consumed by the postcon-
viction habeas process.
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